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CYBERCRIME LITIGATION

JONATHAN MAYER†
Cybercrime is, undoubtedly, a growing problem. Scarcely a week goes by without
reports of massive online misconduct. The primary federal legislative response so far
has been to impose computer abuse liability on network attackers. Every state has
enacted a similar statute.
But do these cybercrime statutes actually punish and deter hackers? Members of
Congress and Department of Justice prosecutors think so—and have repeatedly sought to
expand the scope and consequences of liability. Meanwhile, scholars, advocates, and some
judges have argued that computer abuse legislation is overbroad and ineffective. Law
and policy debate has proceeded from these dueling narratives, not from data.
This Article presents the first comprehensive empirical analysis of litigation under the
federal cybercrime statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Drawing on a new dataset
compiled from hundreds of civil and criminal pleadings, the Article addresses fundamental
and unanswered questions about the on-the-ground function of cybercrime law.
The data reflect that there has been a nationwide cybercrime litigation explosion,
and most cases look nothing like the hacker archetype. The overwhelming majority of
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civil claims arise from mundane business and employment disputes, not sophisticated
computer intrusions. And while federal prosecutors do sometimes charge serious offenders,
the plurality fact pattern in criminal litigation involves a low-level government employee
mishandling data. What’s more, cybercrime law appears to be redundant in civil cases,
and there is little reason to believe that it deters the most concerning hackers.
The Article closes with normative recommendations. In the near term, I suggest that
(1) Congress and state legislatures should repeal civil cybercrime liability, (2) prosecutors
should establish enforcement policies that prioritize significant misconduct, and (3) courts
should narrowly construe cybercrime statutes to better effectuate legislative intent. As a
structural matter, I challenge the net benefit of cybercrime law. An expansive computer
abuse construct is a poor fit for modern technology, which is increasingly pervasive and
increasingly shared. Policy should emphasize alternative means of protecting computer
security and privacy.
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“[T]he majority of [cybercrime] cases still involve
‘classic’ hacking activities.”
—Pacific Aerospace & Electronics, Inc. v. Taylor1

INTRODUCTION
Phillip Fadriquela was the archetypal hacker.2 By day, the twenty-six-yearold labored as a data processing drone; by night, he broke into federal
computer systems. “I was just playing,” he would later insist to the media.3 In
1985, Fadriquela earned the first-ever criminal indictment under the primary
federal cybercrime statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).4
1 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see also P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the
Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pacific Aerospace for
the proposition that most CFAA cases are about “classic” hacking); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957
F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing P.C. Yonkers for the same underlying claim); 1st Rate
Mortg. Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Servs. Corp., No. 09-C-471, 2011 WL 666088, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 15, 2011) (same); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass.
2009) (same); Dudick ex rel. Susquehanna Precision, Inc. v. Vaccarro, No. 3:06-CV-2175, 2007 WL
1847435, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2007) (same).
2 See Joseph B. Tompkins, Jr. & Frederick S. Ansell, Computer Crime: Keeping Up with High Tech
Criminals, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1987, at 31, 32 (noting that Fadriquela was the only person who had
ever been indicted under the 1984 law that CFAA then amended in 1986); Glenn D. Baker, Note,
Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the 1990s, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 61, 65-66 (1993) (describing Fadriquela as “a Los Angeles computer hacker”); Mitch Betts, DP
Worker Charged with Hacking, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 11, 1985, at 2 (highlighting the indictment);
Paul Korzeniowski, Agencies’ Hacker Troubles Blamed on Bulletin Board, COMPUTERWORLD, July 8,
1985, at 15 (outlining Fadriquela’s actions in further detail).
3 The Region: Gang Members Aid Landmark Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1985, at OC2.
4 Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31-32. Although at the time of Fadriquela’s indictment
the statute was called “The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” his
conviction is properly understood as the first CFAA conviction because Congress renamed the
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Dyanne Deuel managed medical technicians for a chintzy chain of surgical
clinics.5 Her “1-800-GET-THIN” employer had already aroused suspicion
for unusually frequent complications and misleading advertisements.6 In
2012, Deuel dropped a bombshell whistleblower lawsuit, alleging that
physicians had covered up flagrant malpractice that contributed to a patient’s
death.7 In response, Deuel’s employers filed their own suit alleging a civil
CFAA violation.8 To blow the whistle, they argued, Deuel had checked the
patient’s electronic chart.9 She shouldn’t have.
Fadriquela and Deuel bookend a radical transformation in cybercrime law.
What began as a tentative legislative response to the archetypal young, rogue
hacker has evolved into sweeping doctrine with severe remedies. Read broadly,
contemporary cybercrime law does not just address sophisticated hacking. It
also imposes worldwide civil and criminal liability that displaces trade secret,
property, contract, fraud, and copyright law in the information economy.10
statute “The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act” as part of the 1986 Amendments. See generally Pub.
L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)).
5 Complaint at 3, Deuel v. 1 800 GET THIN, LLC, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012).
6 See Stuart Pfeifer, Another Patient Dies After Lap-Band Surgery, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/23/business/la-fi-lap-band-death-20110924 [https://perma.cc/7WD4XJWK] (“[P]atients’ deaths and injuries have led to a series of wrongful-death and personal injury lawsuits
against 1-800-GET-THIN, its affiliated surgery centers and doctors who performed the procedures.”);
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Warning Letters for Misleading Advertising of
Lap-Band (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm28
3455.htm [https://perma.cc/7SJK-TZQT] (warning consumers that advertisements for 1-800-GET-THIN
“fail to provide required risk information, including warnings, precautions, possible side effects and
contraindications”).
7 Complaint at 14-16, Deuel, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012); Stuart Pfeifer, Patients
Allege ‘Gruesome Conditions’ at Lap-Band Clinics, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/jan/17/business/la-fi-get-thin-whistleblower-20120118 [https://perma.cc/445R-GUP7]. The local
coroner’s expert subsequently described the medical practice as “gross negligence with
incompetence.” Stuart Pfeifer, Errors Cited in Lap-Band Operation, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/19/business/la-fi-get-thin-rojeski-20130420 [https://perma.cc/
B3DV-BTM7].
8 Complaint at 8-11, Beverly Hills Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Deuel, No. 12-CV-1789 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012).
9 Id. at 8.
10 See Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems
and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 441-51 (explaining how a CFAA claim is
both easier to prove than a trade secret claim and less limited by concessions to employee mobility
and morality); Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 340-41 (2004)
(noting how CFAA can protect uncopyrightable information without the limitations of contract
law); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract, Trespass, and
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 297-310 (comparing
contract, copyright, and trespass to chattels protections against CFAA); Thomas E. Booms, Note,
Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 550-51 (2011) (noting that a CFAA claim is easier to prove than a trade
secret claim); Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’
Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 845-46 (2009) (same);
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Proponents of expansive cybercrime law in both the legislative and
executive branches have emphasized the government’s need to combat online
threats that are growing in frequency, impact, and sophistication.11 Scholars,
advocates, and some judges, meanwhile, have argued that computer abuse
legislation is overbroad and ineffective.12 The debate over the appropriate scope
and sanctions for cybercrime law has played out for years, based almost
exclusively on these dueling narratives and their accompanying anecdotes.
Hard data are long overdue.
This Article presents the first comprehensive empirical analysis of
cybercrime litigation in the federal courts. Drawing on a new dataset compiled
from hundreds of civil and criminal CFAA pleadings, the Article answers
foundational questions about the practical function of cybercrime law.
Part I sets the stage, attempting to articulate the two competing
viewpoints on cybercrime liability. It also highlights untested factual
assumptions that underpin both perspectives. Part II dives into data. It begins
by explaining the sources and methodology for this study, then provides
quantitative responses to specific unanswered questions at the heart of the
cybercrime debate. The data reflect that, in recent years, there has been a
nationwide cybercrime litigation explosion—and most of these cases look
nothing like hacking. The overwhelming majority of civil claims arise from
mundane employment and commercial disputes, not sophisticated computer
intrusions. And the most common fact pattern in criminal prosecutions arises
from low-level government employees merely misappropriating data.
Moreover, cybercrime law appears to be both internally and externally
redundant in civil cases, and there is little reason to believe that the law
meaningfully deters sophisticated hackers.
Part III offers three workable recommendations for correcting cybercrime
law. Congress should repeal civil liability because it is misdirected,
unnecessary, and introduces expansionist pressures. The Department of
Justice should articulate a cybercrime enforcement policy that focuses
resources on serious offenders and differentiates among distinct cybercrime
offenses. And, to better fulfill Congressional intent, the courts should
narrowly construe cybercrime statutes.
To conclude, I challenge the net benefit of cybercrime liability. I argue that
dedicated cybercrime statutes have a sharply limited upside. Information
technology has become too pervasive and too shared for computer abuse to

Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial
Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1369, 1390-91 (2011) (arguing that CFAA threatens to displace state contract and trade secret law).
11 See infra Section I.A.
12 See infra Section I.B.
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remain an expansive legal construct. Congress should focus on alternative
mechanisms for promoting cybersecurity.
I. COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON CYBERCRIME LAW
Initially, cybercrime law was not very controversial.13 When the state and
federal legislatures began dabbling in the area in the 1970s and 1980s, they
were bolstered by contemporaneous, sensationalized media reports of
youthful hacking escapades.14 Prosecutors requested new tools for
investigating and combating electronic misconduct, and lawmakers were quick
to equip them.15 While a handful of commenters questioned the need for
dedicated computer abuse statutes and expressed hypothetical concerns about
overbreadth, they posed scant political opposition. Congress enacted CFAA in
1984, and by 2000, every state had a cybercrime law on the books.16
13 See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization: The Case of
Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 106-07 (1988) (recounting that media attention in the
early 1980s “ensured that both the public and its elected representatives ‘knew’ that computer crime
was a major problem and that something had to be done quickly”).
14 See id. (describing media fixation on “juvenile hackers and the perceived threat of computer
crime” in the early 1980s); Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 910, 917-18 (2003) (noting that CFAA was passed
in part due to the movie WarGames, which reinforced a public fear of computer crime); Mary M.
Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory
Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 175-77 (2000) (emphasizing that WarGames strongly influenced the public’s
stereotype of what a hacker looks like); Declan McCullagh, From ‘WarGames’ to Aaron Swartz: How U.S.
Anti-Hacking Law Went Astray, CNET (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_357573985-38/from-wargames-to-aaron-swartz-how-u.s-anti-hacking-law-went-astray/ [https://perma.cc/U
C55-DL2L] (describing political and media focus on The 414s, a group of young hackers that accessed
sensitive government and private computer systems around the time that WarGames was released); see also
Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, ¶ 4 (“War Games introduced much of the country to the ‘hacker,’ and its
influence was not lost on members of Congress, who already were trying to decide what to do about . . .
network trespassers . . . .”); Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31 (“[M]any [legal] practitioners probably
consider computer crime to be the light-hearted, glamorous avocation of whiz kids.”).
15 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-297, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: MANAGEMENT, SECURITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 89-91 (Feb. 1986)
(providing an overview of computer crime legislative proposals in the 98th and 99th Congresses); Robin K.
Kutz, Note, Computer Crime in Virginia: A Critical Examination of the Criminal Offenses in the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 785-88 (1986) (observing that law enforcement in the 1970s realized
that federal criminal law did not easily cover computer crime, so Congress intervened to pass new legislation).
16 See Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 12, 2015), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-andunauthorized-access-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/96WE-3P88] (collecting state computer abuse
statutes); see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 13, at 101-04 (reviewing how state law
evolved to address computer crime); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1003, 1017 (2001) (“[W]hen Vermont enacted a statute proscribing computer crime in 1999, it
became the fiftieth state to devote specific legislation to computer crimes.”); John Montgomery,
Computer Crime, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 429, 430 (1987) (noting the proliferation of state computer
crime statutes by 1987); Douglas M. Reimer, Judicial and Legislative Responses to Computer Crimes, 53
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Beginning in the mid-2000s, the cybercrime law debate took on new
vitality—and became more heated. Prosecutors and their allies in Congress
continued to request expanded authority, emphasizing the increasing
frequency, magnitude, and sophistication of online attacks.17 Section A
attempts to articulate the best arguments in favor of this expansionist
perspective on cybercrime law.
Scholars and advocacy organizations, meanwhile, began to press for a
rollback.18 The law had become too broad and too ambiguous, they argued.
Courts started to agree, adopting narrower interpretations of statutory scope
and, in one high-profile case, concluding that a criminal offense was
unconstitutionally vague.19 Section B explains this critical perspective on
cybercrime, drawing on policy arguments and anecdotes of litigation abuse.
Section C closes with an explanation of why empirical analyses are
overdue. Evaluating these two perspectives is impossible in the abstract,
because they depend upon particular factual assumptions about the function
of cybercrime law. Policymakers and the judiciary require an understanding
of the law on the ground.
A. The Expansionist Perspective
At one pole of the cybercrime litigation debate, proponents argue in favor
of sweeping liability and stringent remedies.20 Online malfeasance is
spiraling out of control, the reasoning goes. Consumers are increasingly at
risk for online fraud, identity theft, harassment, and worse. Sophisticated
INS. COUNS. J. 406, 419-30 (1986) (surveying computer crime statutes in twenty-three states);
Michael P. Dierks, Note, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 322-25 (1993)
(reviewing the evolution of state computer crime law); Kutz, supra note 15, at 789-90 (describing the
varying computer crime statutes in fourty-five states by 1986).
17 ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1 (2013).
18 See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
20 The perspective in this Section is, necessarily, a synthesis of myriad viewpoints. For detailed
arguments in favor of expanding cybercrime law, see generally Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of
Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc Approach to an Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L.
81 (1999); Richard Warner, The Employer’s New Weapon: Employee Liability Under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 11 (2008); Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized
Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395 (2007); Sarah Castle, Note, Cyberbullying on Trial:
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and United States v. Drew, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 579 (2009); Joseph P.
Daly, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—A New Perspective: Let the Punishment Fit the Damage,
12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445 (1993); Graham M. Liccardi, Note, The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2008); Matthew Aaron Viana, Note, Aaron’s Law: Reactionary Legislation in
the Guise of Justice, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 214 (2015); Scott Zambo, Note, Digital La Cosa Nostra: The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act’s Failure to Punish and Deter Organized Crime, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 551 (2007).
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intruders are ransacking businesses and universities for their intellectual
property. Foreign powers are pilfering government secrets.
The usual legal mechanism for addressing misconduct is, of course, imposing
liability. Businesses should have legal recourse to protect their property-like
rights in information technology and intellectual assets.21 And prosecutors should
have effective legal tools for investigating and addressing online misconduct.
There are some high-profile criminal litigation successes to report. The
Department of Justice effectively dismantled LulzSec, a hacker collective that
breached or disabled over a dozen online services.22 Federal prosecutors have
also knocked major botnets and malware vendors offline.23
But because the status quo still involves an unacceptable level of
cybercrime, the thinking goes, broader authorities and tougher sanctions are
needed.24 Otherwise, would-be hackers will remain insufficiently deterred (ex
ante) or punished (ex post).
21 See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 (“The CFAA essentially functions like a federal claim for
trespass.”); Winn, supra note 20, at 1397-1403 (viewing CFAA as a property right in information technology).
22 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Leading Member of the International
Cybercriminal Group “Lulzsec” Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court (May 27, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/leading-member-international-cybercriminal-group-lulzsecsentenced-manhattan-federal [https://perma.cc/DV5P-4B6P]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office,
Cent. Dist. of Cal., Second Member of Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Prison for Stealing
Customer Information from Sony Pictures Computers (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usaocdca/pr/second-member-hacking-group-sentenced-over-year-prison-stealing-customer-information [https://
perma.cc/7EFZ-N6YZ]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Guilty Plea of Jeremy Hammond for Hacking into the Stratfor Website (May 28, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-guilty-plea-jeremy-hammondhacking-stratfor-website [https://perma.cc/F8N3-5PYJ]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of
Cal., Member of LulzSec Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Federal Prison for 2011 Intrusion into
Sony Pictures Computer Systems (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/member-lulzsechacking-group-sentenced-over-year-federal-prison-2011-intrusion-sony [https://perma.cc/YAS7-3X9R]; see
also GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY: THE MANY FACES OF
ANONYMOUS 237-75 (2014) (describing the LulzSec group).
23 E.g., David B. Fein, Major Achievements in the Courtroom: Coreflood Botnet Takedown & Civil Action,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/cyber-crime/majorachievements-courtroom-coreflood-botnet-takedown-civil-action [https://perma.cc/ZY9B-KZ73]; Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Major Computer Hacking Forum Dismantled (July 15, 2015), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/major-computer-hacking-forum-dismantled [https://perma.cc/5TVH-F6UF];
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pakistani Man Indicted for Selling ‘StealthGenie’ Spyware App (Sept.
29, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-man-indicted-selling-stealthgenie-spyware-app
[https://perma.cc/5SDQ-9ZEE]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Leads Multi-National
Action Against “Gameover Zeus” Botnet and “Cryptolocker” Ransomware, Charges Botnet
Administrator (June 2, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-leads-multi-national-action-againstgameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware [https://perma.cc/9632-DD55]; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyber Criminal Pleads Guilty to Developing and Distributing Notorious
SpyEye Malware (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cyber-criminal-pleads-guiltydeveloping-and-distributing-notorious-spyeye-malware [https://perma.cc/YD66-5DCZ].
24 See, e.g., Cyber Crime: Modernizing Our Legal Framework for the Information Age: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement
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The expansionist perspective has manifested itself in several federal
legislative proposals. In 2011, the White House and the Department of Justice
drafted a high-profile CFAA reform package that would have expanded the scope
of liability, increased prison sentences, provided civil forfeiture authority, and
added a RICO predicate offense.25 The 2011 package has been the basis for more
recent proposals, including a 2013 discussion draft that was circulated by the
House Judiciary Committee staff,26 an early 2015 White House pitch in
conjunction with the State of the Union,27 and a mid-2015 draft Senate bill.28
The expansionist perspective on cybercrime law is, to be sure, not an
absolutist perspective. Department of Justice officials have acknowledged
concerns about statutory overbreadth and have emphasized the limiting role
of prosecutorial discretion.29 More recent legislative proposals have also
of David M. Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (describing court
decisions that narrowly construe CFAA as “unfortunate”) [hereinafter Bitkower statement]; Taking
Down Botnets: Public and Private Efforts to Disrupt and Dismantle Cybercriminal Networks: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2014)
(statement of Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that
CFAA is not “up to date” and must “keep up with rapidly evolving technologies and uses”);
Cybercrime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyberspace and Combat Emerging
Threats: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-4 (2011) (statement of James A.
Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that federal law must
“more effectively deter” computer crime and setting forth a proposal to amend the law to “increase
the maximum penalties”).
25 See GINA STEVENS & JONATHAN MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41941, THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CYBERSECURITY PROPOSAL: CRIMINAL PROVISIONS 3-6 (2011)
(describing the provisions of the reform package).
26 See Mike Masnick, Rather Than Fix the CFAA, House Judiciary Planning to Make It Worse . . . Way
Worse, TECHDIRT (Mar. 25, 2013, 5:43 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130324/14342822435/
rather-than-fix-cfaa-house-judiciary-committee-planning-to-make-it-worse-way-worse.shtml [https://
perma.cc/LS2E-25HM] (describing the unattributed discussion draft and providing a copy).
27 THE WHITE HOUSE, UPDATED ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updatedlaw-enforcement-tools.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z7Y-AT96]; see also Letter from Shaun Donovan, Dir.,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Jan. 13,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cybersecurity-letters-tocongress-house-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP7U-6U36] (presenting and summarizing the Obama
Administration’s proposed substantive changes to the existing statutory regime); Barack H. Obama,
2015 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/CX9A-7WRH]
(“I [President Obama] urge this Congress to finally pass the legislation we need to better meet the
evolving threat of cyberattacks . . . .”).
28 See Harley Geiger, Graham/Whitehouse Draft Bill Would Make CFAA Worse, CDT BLOG (July
17, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/grahamwhitehouse-draft-bill-would-make-cfaa-worse/ [https://perma.
cc/F5ND-68JC] (explaining the proposed legislation and providing a copy).
29 See Bitkower statement, supra note 24, at 6 (“These [limiting] judicial decisions stemmed
from the concern that the relevant provision of the CFAA could potentially make relatively trivial
conduct a federal crime—such as checking the baseball scores . . . in violation of an employer’s strict
Internet use policy. The department has no interest in prosecuting such harmless acts.”); Leslie R.
Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and Government Insiders, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.:
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included (very modest) protections for ordinary Internet users.30 But the core
of the viewpoint remains that cybercrime law is a valuable and effective tool,
and litigation abuses are and will be rare and manageable.

JUST. BLOGS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/prosecuting-privacy-abuses-corporateand-government-insiders [https://perma.cc/4LNL-PXN2] (“We understand these [overbreadth]
concerns. The Department of Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use
restrictions like these.”).
30 The 2015 Obama administration proposal would introduce a new monetary threshold for
CFAA liability. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 27 (triggering liability under CFAA only if the
value of the illegally-acquired information exceeds $5000). Given how easily litigants have pled
around CFAA’s existing monetary threshold, it is not apparent that this provision would
meaningfully constrain liability.
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B. The Critical Perspective
A competing view of cybercrime liability has gained traction,31
particularly among scholars,32 policy advocates,33 and members of the
31 While this Article endeavors to objectively assess cybercrime litigation in the federal courts,
in the interest of complete transparency, I fall firmly within the school of thought that criticizes
cybercrime law. That view is informed as much by policy and legal considerations as it is by the
empirical assessment presented here.
32 A voluminous academic literature has criticized cybercrime law, and especially CFAA, as
overbroad or overly punitive. See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 10, at 440-56 (explaining that CFAA
presents inconsistencies with trade secret law); Galbraith, supra note 10, at 361-66 (arguing that
courts have improperly construed CFAA to permit website owners to enforce restrictions on access
to and use of copyrightable information); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1617-32 (2003) (explaining how
courts have expansively interpreted the concepts of “access” and “authorization” under CFAA to
capture undesirable behavior, and arguing that such a broad sweep is normatively undesirable); Orin
S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1575-78
(2010) (arguing that a broad construction of “authorization” under CFAA may amount to
unconstitutional vagueness); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 155, 182-208 (2013) (criticizing CFAA for permitting both criminal and civil liability for
contractual breaches); O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 (“Congress likely did not intend the [CFAA]
statute to become the potent weapon that it now is ‘against employees, former employees,
competitors and others.’ Unanticipated uses of the Act have arisen because its language is not limited
to cases of hacking but instead is broad enough to encompass a wide range of conduct.” (footnote
omitted)); Skibell, supra note 14, at 922-43 (arguing that CFAA mistakenly treats the crime of
trespass and the crime of fraud or theft identically, imposes unfair punishments on some individuals,
has done little to slow the growth of computer crime, and imposes unnecessarily high penalties that
do not serve proper deterrent or retribution purposes). See generally Booms, supra note 10; Sarah
Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 661 (2009); Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science
Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2010); Dierks, supra note 16;
Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ Authorization
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819 (2009); Andrew T. Hernacki, Note,
A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543 (2012); Haeji Hong, Note, Hacking Through the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1997); Nicholas R. Johnson, Recent Developments,
“I Agree” to Criminal Liability: Lori Drew’s Prosecution Under § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, and Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561;
Caroline G. Jones, Note, Computer Hackers on the Cul-de-Sac: MySpace Suicide Indictment Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Sets Dangerous Precedent, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 261 (2011); Ryan Patrick
Murray, Note, MySpace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service Agreements Should Not
Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475 (2009); Warren Thomas,
Note, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and
Solving the Split over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2011); Garrett D.
Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations
of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369
(2011); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127
HARV. L. REV. 751 (2013).
33 See, e.g., Letter from Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2Coalition) et al., to Rep. Jim
Sensenbrenner et al. (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.eff.org/files/cfaa_innovators_letter_3-12-13_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QQR-YFW8] (urging Congress to reform CFAA due to its chilling effects on
innovation and economic growth in the technology field).
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judiciary.34 This perspective emphasizes how broad, vague cybercrime law poses
grave legal peril for innocuous—and often desirable—computer-related conduct.35
Articulations of this critical viewpoint tend to invoke the following at-risk
categories of computer users.
1.

Consumers

Under expansive cybercrime liability, run-of-the-mill online conduct
could become a criminal offense. In Judge Kozinski’s memorable phrasing,
ordinary consumers would “have to live at the mercy of [their] local
prosecutor.”36 He added, “[P]osting for sale an item prohibited by Craigslist’s
policy, or describing yourself as ‘tall, dark and handsome,’ when you’re
actually short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”37
The prosecution of Lori Drew is an oft-invoked anecdote in support of
this critical perspective. Drew’s cybercrime liability rested on breaching the
social network MySpace’s terms of use.38 The district court concluded that
Drew had committed a statutory offense, but set aside the jury conviction as
unconstitutionally void for vagueness.39
More recently, federal prosecutors brought cybercrime charges against
gamblers who discovered a glitch in slot machine payouts.40 The case was dropped
only after a magistrate judge recommended dismissal on statutory grounds.41
2. Employees
Surveys have consistently found that many, if not most, employees breach
corporate information technology policies.42 They shirk at work, swap
34 For a particularly sharp critique offered by then–Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, see United
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of CFAA
on statutory, constitutional, and policy grounds). See also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508,
523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199,
203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same).
35 In the interest of brevity, this Article focuses on policy perspectives and empirical analysis
rather than legal synthesis. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that nearly all online conduct
that is conceivably objectionable could plausibly fall within the scope of civil and criminal sanctions.
See supra note 32.
36 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
37 Id.
38 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862
(discussing Drew as a poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
39 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464.
40 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge at 1-2, United States v.
Kane, No. 2:11-cr-00022 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2012), ECF No. 86.
41 Id. at 9.
42 See, e.g., CISCO SYS. INC., DATA LEAKAGE WORLDWIDE: COMMON RISKS AND MISTAKES
EMPLOYEES MAKE 1-7 (2008), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise-networks/
data-loss-prevention/white_paper_c11-499060.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXG-EW2Y] (giving numerous
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passwords, take files home, and keep data when they exit the firm. All of these
routine indiscretions could be criminal under a broad interpretation of
cybercrime law: federal appellate courts have sustained liability merely for
browsing a work database (in violation of employer policy)43 and taking files to a
competitor (in violation of fiduciary responsibilities).44 Employers also would be
equipped with a powerful civil cudgel against their former employees, enabling
retaliation for exercising legal rights or whistleblowing.45
3. Entrepreneurs
Many online startups are iterative, built atop another business’s
technology and data.46 A broad cybercrime law would encompass these
innovation models such that failure to obtain a “platform” business’s
permission would result in civil and criminal liability.47 This concern is no
hypothetical—Craigslist,48 Facebook,49 and Oracle50 have all used CFAA to
examples of employee misuse of information technology); PONEMON INST., DATA LOSS RISKS
DURING DOWNSIZING: AS EMPLOYEES EXIT, SO DOES CORPORATE DATA 3-24 (2009), http://
eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-data_loss_risks_during_downsizing_study_
WP.en-us.pdf [http://perma.cc/47F4-FEU8] (providing in-depth data on misuse of confidential
information); SYMANTEC CORP., WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: HOW EMPLOYEES ARE PUTTING
YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT RISK 2 (2013) https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/white
paper/WP_WhatsYoursIsMine-HowEmployeesarePuttingYourIntellectualPropertyatRisk_dai211501_
cta69167.pdf [https://perma.cc/43KA-NQHN] (showing the “top reasons” why employees take
corporate data).
43 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
44 Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
45 See, e.g., Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904, 2011 WL 1742028, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011)
(dismissing a cybercrime counterclaim by a former employer in a wrongful termination suit, which
alleged that the former employee was liable for merely checking personal email and social network
accounts); see also United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lee as an example
of cybercrime overbreadth risks).
46 The in-vogue term for this phenomenon is “platform.” See Benjamin Edelman, How to
Launch Your Digital Platform, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2015, at 92 (using the term “platform” to refer
to shared technology foundations for new small businesses).
47 See ALEXIS OHANIAN, WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION 199-231 (2013) (arguing that
information technology innovation occurs without seeking permission in advance, and laws that
require permission necessarily impede innovation).
48 See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (using
CFAA against a business that republished classified advertisements); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.,
942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 2d 1039, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (using CFAA against a business that enabled automatic posting
of classified advertisements).
49 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (using CFAA against a website that aggregated information from multiple social network
feeds); Facebook, Inc. v. MaxBounty, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 279, 281 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using CFAA against
a marketing company that created misleading social network pages).
50 See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. TERiX Comput. Co., No. 13-cv-03385, 2014 WL 31344, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (using CFAA against an aftermarket service provider for database software); Oracle Am.,
Inc. v. Serv. Key, LLC, No. 12-cv-00790, 2012 WL 6019580, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (same).
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shut down derivative ventures. Even the Internet Archive, a nonprofit online
library, was targeted with cybercrime litigation on the theory that it
impermissibly browsed a public website with an automated crawler.51
4. Journalists
Investigative reporting often involves assessing obscure and unintended
online sources. For instance, in a recent high-profile dispute, journalists at
Scripps Howard discovered that FCC-subsidized telecommunications
providers had leaked sensitive subscriber information onto the public
Internet.52 One of the telecom firms responded by threatening cybercrime
litigation against Scripps on the theory that the reporters lacked authorized
access to the subscriber data.53 The FCC subsequently fined the firms for
their deficient security practices.54
In another episode, reporters from Vanity Fair and a local newspaper used
online resources to investigate a “cult-like” executive training firm.55 The
training firm sued, alleging that Vanity Fair’s research constituted an actionable
violation of cybercrime law.56 After nearly two years of litigation, its claims
were dismissed as untimely.57
5. Security Researchers
Outside experts routinely evaluate information technology systems for
security shortcomings. But the purveyors of those systems tend to get testy
when deficiencies in their products and services are unceremoniously
exposed.58 For instance, Sony used cybercrime law to prevent a young

51 See Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627,
630-33 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine crawler and its alleged
cybercrime infraction).
52 Sarah Laskow, Reporting, or Illegal Hacking: Scripps Reporters Are Accused of Violating the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 13, 2013), http://www.cjr.org/
cloud_control/scripps_hackers.php [https://perma.cc/RS3W-8S66].
53 Id.
54 Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc., No.
EB-TCD-13-00009175, at 1 (FCC Oct. 24, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
FCC-14-173A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTE7-NDWA].
55 See William D. Cohan, How a Strange, Secretive, Cult-Like Company Is Waging Legal War Against
Journalists, NATION (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-strange-secretive-cultcompany-waging-legal-war-against-journalists/ [https://perma.cc/AQ2L-R6W6].
56 Id.
57 NXIVM Corp. v. Foley, No. 14-cv-01375, slip op. at 13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015)
58 See, e.g., Letter from Alex Stamos et al. to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/files/dc_bh_letter_f4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP38-BDMQ] (“[P]aradoxically, the
CFAA currently threatens and chills valuable research in the field by reaching mere violations of terms of
use and other acts, such as security research, which cause no real harm and indeed make the public safer.”).
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researcher from examining its PlayStation 3 video game system;59 the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority prevented MIT students from
presenting flaws in its fare payment system;60 and federal prosecutors won a
conviction against a researcher who exposed a vulnerability in AT&T’s iPad
registration system.61 Criticism along this line has emphasized that
cybercrime liability is, in fact, backfiring: by chilling vital research,
cybercrime law actually reduces computer security.62
Legal scholars have noted how conventional doctrines of trespass, labor
law, trade secret, copyright, and contract make concessions to these sorts of
public interests.63 Cybercrime law, however, offers no such limiting
principles. There are no implied easements. No employee rights. No secrecy
and independent wrongdoing elements. No fair use defense. No limits on
contract formation and interpretation. Absence of permission is too often the
beginning and the end of a cybercrime liability inquiry.
These are far from the only lines of attack. Critics question the very
notion of using criminal law to deter computer intrusions when perpetrators
are often difficult to identify or outside the reach of United States law.64 Some
of the worst offenders are sponsored by foreign governments: in spring 2014,
for instance, the Department of Justice indicted Chinese military officers for
cybercrime offenses.65 The litigation was purely symbolic given that “there is
virtually no chance” China would turn over the indicted officers.66 Similarly, in
spring 2016, federal prosecutors indicted hackers working for Iran’s Revolutionary

59 Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. 11-cv-0167, 2011 WL 347137, at *1- 2 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 27, 2011).
60 Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-cv-11364
(D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2008).
61 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529-30, 532 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit
subsequently vacated the conviction on venue grounds. Id. at 529.
62 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64 See Dierks, supra note 16, at 332-36 (arguing that deterrence has failed in computer crime
law owing to difficulty in detecting breaches, identifying perpetrators, building a case, and
encouraging reporting by victims); Skibell, supra note 14, at 935-37 (“Deterrence theory needs to
account for the empirical evidence that nineteen years under the CFAA has done little to slow the
growth of computer crime.”); Calkins, supra note 14, at 183-84 (noting practical difficulties in
enforcing computer crime law).
65 Indictment, United States v. Dong, Crim. No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2014); see also Jonathan
Mayer, Charges Against Chinese, and U.S. Policy on Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/charges-against-chinese-and-us-policy-on-hacking.html
[https://perma.cc/2N6V-GZ69].
66 Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workerswith-cyberspying.html [https://perma.cc/29L8-V828].
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Guard.67 There is little reason to believe that the defendants “will ever appear in
an American courtroom.”68 Computer security policy should emphasize incentives
to protect information technology, the thinking goes, and not be chasing after
predictable, persistent, and extraterritorial attackers.
Redundant liability is another category of concern from the critical
perspective. Courts were slow at first in adapting conventional legal doctrines
to information technology. But as courts have familiarized themselves with
navigating computer-related disputes, conventional legal doctrines have
caught up with advances in technology. There is, consequently, a lesser need
for purpose-built computer causes of action.69
A final sticking point is the draconian sentencing regime associated with
cybercrime liability, especially at the federal level.70 This issue gained national
prominence when federal prosecutors charged Internet activist Aaron Swartz
with CFAA offenses that carried a maximum sentence of decades in prison.71
Swartz tragically took his own life rather than stand trial.72
More recently, a middle school student in Florida logged into his teacher’s
computer and changed the desktop wallpaper.73 The local sheriff’s department
charged him with a felony under the state cybercrime statute, carrying an adult
prison sentence of up to five years.74
The critical view of cybercrime law has begun to manifest itself in
legislative proposals. One example is Aaron’s Law, a bipartisan proposal
introduced in both houses of the current 114th Congress that would curb

Indictment, United States v. Fathi, No. 16 Crim. 48 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016).
David E. Sanger, U.S. Indicts 7 Iranians in Cyberattacks on Banks and a Dam, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/middleeast/us-indicts-iranians-in-cyber
attacks-on-banks-and-a-dam.html [https://perma.cc/V845-67AC].
69 See, e.g., Mark Jaycox, Why the CFAA’s Excessive Criminalization Needs Reform, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/04/cfaas-excessive-criminalization
[https://perma.cc/XDH3-UZU3] (identifying numerous overlaps between CFAA and other theories of
criminal and civil liability).
70 See Orin Kerr, A Question for Supporters of Increasing Maximum Sentences Under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/28/aquestion-for-supporters-of-increasing-maximum-sentences-under-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/
[https://perma.cc/SJR3-STB5] (“Congress is considering legislation to increase maximum punishments
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act . . . . [H]ave there been any cases in which judges maxed out
the current sentences . . . ?”).
71 John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at26.html [https://perma/cc/9BBY-77VM].
72 Id.
73 Josh Solomon, Middle School Student Charged with Cybercrime in Holiday, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/middle-school-studentcharged-with-cyber-crime-in-holiday/2224827 [https://perma/cc/F8CD-PD8Z].
74 Id.
67
68
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CFAA’s scope and penalties.75 Another bill, proposed in the Senate during
the 113th Congress, was a comprehensive data protection bill that included a
provision narrowing CFAA’s scope.76
The critical perspective on cybercrime law is—like the expansionist
perspective—not absolutist. Recommendations have centered on reform, rather
than total repeal.77 Cybercrime law does play a legitimate and important role
in promoting cybersecurity, the thinking goes. It has just gone too far.
C. Why Empirical Analyses Are Necessary
These competing perspectives on cybercrime law are essentially competing
empirical hypotheses. Proponents of the expansionist perspective do recognize
the potential for cybercrime litigation abuse. And critics of broad cybercrime
liability do acknowledge the value of legal remedies against hackers.
Where the two sides fundamentally part ways is their assessment of the
on-the-ground, practical impact of cybercrime law. The expansionist hypothesis
is that “the majority of CFAA cases still involve ‘classic’ hacking activities,”78
such that cybercrime law primarily functions as a unique and proportional
response to the most concerning computer abuses. The critical hypothesis is
that most cases involve minor and technically unsophisticated misconduct, and
cybercrime law has become redundant and excessively punitive.79 There is no
abstract means of adjudicating the descriptive accuracy of these competing
hypotheses. Both sides are facially credible, bolstered by plausible arguments

75 Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015); Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, S. 1030,
114th Cong. (2015).
76 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. §§ 107, 110 (2014). This
effort draws on an earlier reform amendment sponsored by Senators Grassley, Franken, and Lee.
See Jake Laperruque & Greg Nojeim, Why Fibbing About Your Age Is Relevant to the Cybersecurity Bill,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 30, 2012), https://cdt.org/blog/why-fibbing-about-your-ageis-relevant-to-the-cybersecurity-bill/ [https://perma.cc/3V7R-WZDA]. A prior version of Senator Leahy’s
proposal included a more questionable attempt to narrow CFAA. See Orin Kerr, My Assessment of Senator
Leahy’s Proposed Amendment to the CFAA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/2011/11/22/my-assessment-of-senator-leahys-proposed-amendment-to-the-cfaa/ [https://
perma.cc/KM5K-G6KJ] (explaining the prior Leahy proposal and noting that it may be ineffective).
77 But see Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Is a Failed Experiment, FORBES
(Mar. 28, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/the-computerfraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment/ [https://perma/cc/Z8XU-E526] (arguing in favor of
substantial repeal); Robert Graham, Aaron’s Law: Repeal CFAA Rather Than Amend It, ERRATA
SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/01/aarons-law-get-rid-of-cfaa.html#.
VtYtC5OzLxM [https://perma.cc/4RER-L5AU] (suggesting that total repeal would not create
additional vulnerabilities or remove penalties for other cybercrimes).
78 Pacific Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see
also supra note 1.
79 See supra Section I.B.

1470

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1452

and effective anecdotes. Only data can determine which hypothesis is more
precise—and so far, data have been entirely missing from the debate.
The balance of this Article illuminates these competing hypotheses with
data, providing the first comprehensive empirical analysis of cybercrime
litigation.80 I focus on CFAA, since it is the best-known and most frequently
litigated cybercrime statute.
II. AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF CYBERCRIME LITIGATION
Section A opens by explaining data sources and methodology. This
Section assumes that readers have rough familiarity with CFAA’s structure
and individual offenses.
Sections B and C begin the descriptive empirical analysis by examining
longitudinal trends in order to understand the scale and severity of cybercrime
litigation. Section B reports that civil cybercrime litigation has skyrocketed,
while the criminal caseload steadily increased but then leveled off in the past
decade. Section C examines criminal penalties, finding that the mean period of
incarceration has greatly lengthened, but that the median case still results in no
prison sentence.
Section D shifts to detailed latitudinal analysis of fact patterns,
categorizing the conduct and party relationships that underlie cybercrime
litigation. The data reflect that most civil cases involve technically
unsophisticated conduct in the context of a commercial or employment
dispute. Among criminal cases, the plurality fact pattern merely involves
government employees misappropriating information.
Section E examines whether cybercrime law is redundant. Data on civil
claims suggest that CFAA’s various provisions substantially overlap with
existing causes of action, which alone are sufficient. Criminal charging data
are murkier, suggesting that CFAA offenses are somewhat unique—but that
prosecutors strategically blur theories of liability where sentencing
enhancements are available.
Section F takes up the question of deterrence. I compare the federal
cybercrime caseload to the estimated scope of cybercrime harm and find an
extraordinary mismatch. There is little cause to believe that cybercrime law
meaningfully deters sophisticated misconduct.
80 There has been remarkably little quantitative research on cybercrime law. But see Anele
Nwokoma, Process Evaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 17 PROC. INFO. SYS.
EDUC. CONF. § 128 (2000) (reporting Department of Justice statistics on CFAA usage); George
Roach & William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61, 62 (2006) (finding that many courts reject civil CFAA claims for
insufficient “loss” or “damage”); McCullagh, supra note 14 (plotting longitudinal invocation of
CFAA in federal opinions).
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Section G closes the analysis by comparing the two high-level hypotheses
of cybercrime law against the empirical results. I conclude that there is strong
support for the critical hypothesis as applied to civil litigation. In criminal
cases, though, I find a more complex picture. There is evidence of overbreadth
and ineffective deterrence, in line with the critical hypothesis. But there is
also some evidence of prosecutorial discretion and charge uniqueness, in
accord with the expansionist hypothesis.
A. Data Sources and Methodology
The empirical analysis in this Article draws on data from civil pleadings, criminal
charging documents, judicial opinions, sentencing records, and news reports.
Detailed data on civil claims and criminal charges are difficult to obtain. At
present, there are no means of searching the text of all federal litigation filings.
To build a comprehensive latitudinal dataset of civil pleadings and criminal
charging documents,81 I began with expansive keyword searches on Bloomberg
Law and Westlaw for CFAA-related court filings.82 Next, I augmented the
results with charging materials from Department of Justice public
announcements. I then manually winnowed the documents, labeling each with
CFAA claims/charges,83 non-CFAA claims/charges, party/victim relationships,
and underlying conduct.84 In total, I reviewed approximately 600 court filings
(about 20,000 pages). The complete civil dataset included 325 pleadings and
the criminal dataset included 106 charging documents and 133 defendants.85
Both datasets are open and available online for future research use.86
Aggregate longitudinal data on judicial opinions are drawn directly from
Westlaw. I used keyword searches to identify CFAA opinions,87 then
extracted Westlaw’s ordinary fields for date, court, and parties.
This project began in mid-2013. I selected 2012 as the last complete calendar year of court filings.
Specifically, I used the query: (“computer fraud”) OR (“18 U.S.C. 1030”) OR (“18 USC
1030”) OR (“18 U.S.C. § 1030”) OR (“18 USC § 1030”) OR (“18:1030”) OR (“fraud activity
connected with computers”) OR (“unauthorized access to a computer”). The latter two phrases are
commonly used on criminal dockets involving a CFAA charge.
83 Many filings are imprecise about the specific CFAA cause of action. Where a filing was not explicit,
I attempted to infer the relevant subsections by comparing the text of the filing to the text of the statute.
84 There is, to be sure, no neat taxonomy of party relationships and underlying conduct. I made
an initial review of the documents to discern the most common fact patterns, then applied those
categories in a second review.
85 Given the volume of civil pleadings, I did not filter out multiple filings from the same proceeding.
For criminal charging documents, by contrast, I located the latest document for each proceeding.
86 The civil dataset is available at https://perma.cc/5JM2-XQG9 [hereinafter Civil Dataset].
The criminal dataset is available at https://perma.cc/U75B=XHZW [hereinafter Criminal Dataset].
87 Since I did not manually confirm that each opinion concerned a CFAA theory, I used a
narrower search query than for pleadings: “computer fraud and abuse.” The results under this
methodology, to be sure, include false positives and negatives. Aggregate figures on judicial opinions
should be considered as estimates, reflective of trends in federal litigation.
81
82
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Finally, aggregate criminal longitudinal data were obtained from the
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics and the TRACfed
Criminal Enforcement project at Syracuse University.88
B. What Is the Volume of Cybercrime Litigation?
Understanding the longitudinal dynamics of cybercrime litigation is a
critical first-order matter. First, the volume of litigation is informative as to
whether cybercrime statutes merit scholarly, judicial, and policymaker
attention. If cybercrime litigation were exceedingly rare, subsidiary issues
would largely become moot.
A second reason for beginning with longitudinal analysis is to understand
how litigation practices have changed. An abrupt uptick in civil or criminal
litigation constitutes a warning sign, suggestive of strategic statutory abuse.
And, in criminal cases, a tapering off is suggestive of limited investigatory
resources or capabilities.
The following subsections examine longitudinal trends for civil and
criminal cybercrime litigation, respectively.
1. Civil Litigation
Civil cybercrime litigation has unambiguously exploded. Congress first
enacted a private cause of action in 1994; for approximately the first decade
of its existence, CFAA lay relatively fallow as a civil recourse. Then, between
2002 and 2012, district court opinions surged by over an order of magnitude.89
The federal appellate courts have also been reviewing civil CFAA disputes at
an increasing rate.90

88 Criminal Enforcement, TRACFED, http://tracfed.syr.edu/ [https://perma.cc/B2GQ-TS5Z]
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016); Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/ [https://perma.cc/UE5K-AYSD] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The two
datasets use slightly different means of classifying prosecutions: the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics
dataset reports all defendants with a CFAA charge, while the TRACFed dataset reports only
defendants where prosecutors noted a “lead” CFAA charge. Also, the DOJ BJS dataset only offers
annual summary statistics, rather than individual case tracking. In order to associate prosecutions,
convictions, and sentences in both datasets, I make the simplifying assumption that all three stages
of litigation are contemporaneous.
89 See infra Figure 1.
90 See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Federal Court Opinions – Civil

The uptick in civil CFAA litigation is not cabined by geography. Private
cybercrime claims are on the rise in federal district courts and in every
regional court of appeals, with the sole exception of the D.C. Circuit.91
Figure 2: Federal District Court Opinions – Civil, by Circuit

91

See infra Figure 2.
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This sudden surge in civil cybercrime litigation suggests that cases are
motivated by shifts in litigation strategy, rather than shifts in the underlying
cybercrime problem.92 Given that cybercrime has also rapidly increased,
though, the evidence is hardly conclusive. Section D returns to the issue of
civil cybercrime litigation with a detailed latitudinal analysis of pleadings.
The trend in civil cybercrime litigation is notably reminiscent of the
federal courts’ experience with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act.93 In the years immediately following its
enactment, plaintiffs simply ignored the statute; during the first decade, there
were just nine published opinions addressing civil claims under the Act.94 In
the following three years, however, courts published over 200 civil RICO
opinions.95 Strategic litigants recognized that conventional commercial
disputes—with no nexus whatsoever to organized crime—could be
transmuted into federal claims, with potential for recovering treble damages
and attorneys’ fees.96
2. Criminal Litigation
Since federal criminal cases are often resolved without substantial judicial
intervention, opinions in criminal CFAA matters are rare. Nevertheless, as
with civil litigation, trial and appellate courts are increasingly addressing
criminal issues under CFAA, as demonstrated in Figure 3.

92 The growth in CFAA litigation is difficult to attribute to expanded statutory scope.
Congress substantially expanded CFAA liability in 1996, nearly a decade before the litigation boom.
93 See Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 62-66 (describing the rise in civil RICO litigation and providing data); see
also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (2002) (providing more recent data
on civil RICO litigation).
94 Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 63, 64 n.38.
95 Id. at 64 n.38.
96 Cf. Nick Akerman, CFAA Resembles RICO, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.
nationallawjournal.com/id=900005435711/CFAA-Resembles-RICO [https://perma.cc/BQ5B-TSAJ]
(“As with civil RICO, litigators can no longer overlook the CFAA. Whenever the evidence reflects
that computers are involved in the perpetrating of a wrong, the CFAA should be reviewed for
potential claims. The advantages are obvious. Like RICO, the CFAA is a federal statute and thus
provides automatic federal jurisdiction, when the only available claims might be based on state law
with no diversity jurisdiction. The CFAA also has certain advantages over using RICO (albeit
without the treble damages and attorney fees mandated by RICO).”).
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Figure 3: Federal Court Opinions – Criminal

Longitudinal datasets on prosecutorial practice confirm a brisk upswing
in cybercrime charging, between the late 1990s and early 2000s. Then, from
the mid-2000s on, cybercrime charging leveled off.97
Figure 4: Federal Criminal Prosecutions

Data on convictions closely parallel the trends in data on charging—rapid
growth from the 1990s to 2000s, then little change.98

97
98

See infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Federal Criminal Convictions

The increase in criminal prosecutions and convictions, while significant,
is not nearly as abrupt or substantial as the apparent increase in civil
litigation. The data, therefore, provide little basis on which to assess the
charging practices of federal prosecutors. Understanding the dynamics of
criminal litigation instead requires exploration of further case detail, as
provided in the following Parts.
Several additional observations warrant mention. First, the surge in
criminal litigation predated the surge in civil litigation by about a decade. The
differing sources of longitudinal data can explain a year or two of discrepancy—
the civil data are drawn exclusively from opinions, not preliminary filings—but
not so wide a span. This result suggests that prosecutors initially paved the way
for broad applicability of cybercrime law, and civil litigants only later took
advantage.99
Another significant result is that the volumes of cybercrime prosecutions
and convictions have remained nearly constant for almost a decade. Given
that the cybercrime problem has continued to grow, this trend suggests that
prosecutors have reached the limit of their capacity for pursuing cybercrime
cases. The longitudinal data do not lend insight, though, into whether that
limit arises from fundamental challenges in investigating and prosecuting
cybercrime, or from artificial personnel and resource constraints.
Finally, there is a persistent gap between cybercrime prosecutions and
convictions. Roughly a quarter of filed charges do not result in a successful
criminal justice outcome. According to Department of Justice data, a share of
these cases can be attributed to acquittal, dismissal, or diversion.100 The majority,
though, appear to result from defendants who are either unidentifiable or outside
the reach of the United States criminal justice system.
99 Cf. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 62-64 (suggesting that criminal prosecutors took
advantage of RICO’s broad provisions slightly before civil plaintiffs).
100 See infra Figure 7 and accompanying text.
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C. How Punitive Are Cybercrime Prosecutions?
A cursory analysis would suggest that sentencing under cybercrime law has
become radically more punitive. A defendant in a concluded prosecution for a
federal cybercrime offense in the 2010s will, on average, receive a sentence of
incarceration about four to five times longer than a defendant in the 1990s, as
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Mean Prison Sentence in Closed Prosecutions (Months)

This account, however, proves to be far too simplistic. Most convicted
cybercrime defendants do not receive a prison sentence; instead, most receive
probation, a fine, a suspended sentence, or no sentence at all.101 Furthermore, a
small fraction of defendants avoid conviction altogether, obtaining dismissal,
pretrial diversion, or acquittal.102
Figure 7: Sentencing for Convicted Defendants (DOJ BJS)

101
102

See infra Figure 8.
See infra Figure 7.
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Figure 8: Outcomes in Closed Prosecutions (DOJ BJS)

From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the ratio of convicted defendants
who received a prison sentence roughly doubled, reaching two in five.103 But
since then, the ratio has remained roughly constant.104
So, if the median convicted defendant continues to receive no prison
sentence, and if the proportion of convicted defendants who receive a prison
sentence has remained steady, why are average cybercrime prison sentences
continuing to increase? One possible explanation is that federal prosecutors
have been successful at targeting major cybercriminals, such that a small
number of outliers are driving up the average.
Figure 9: Prison Sentence, If Any (TRACFED, Months)

103
104

See supra Figure 8.
See supra Figure 8.
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The data tell a different story. Since the mid-2000s, prosecutors have
occasionally secured convictions against serious offenders. But there is not a
burgeoning number of outlier sentences; cybercrime sentencing has remained
clustered.105 Rather, the entire set of cybercrime prison sentences appears to
have been indiscriminately shifted upwards over the past decade, roughly
tripling the average period of incarceration.106
These observations about sentencing practices cut in opposite directions.
On the one hand, the data imply that federal prosecutors are exercising
meaningful discretion in cybercrime cases. Scholars and practitioners have
emphasized how broad felony offenses and elevated sentencing guidelines
facilitate imposing incarceration.107 But the data reflect that prosecutors
generally remain willing to accept minimal, nonprison punishments.
On the other hand, cybercrime prosecutorial discretion is increasingly
bimodal. Where prosecutors do seek and obtain a prison sentence, the period
of incarceration has greatly increased. In the 1990s, a cybercrime prison term
of less than one year was customary; now, it is a rarity.
The most surprising result is just how few defendants are sentenced to prison.
Incarceration serves as a proxy variable for offense severity; where prosecutors
seek and judges impose a nonprison sentence, the underlying computer abuse is
likely minimal. This observation suggests that most federal prosecutions arise
from minor misconduct, not high-profile, large-scale, or sophisticated hacking.

See supra Figure 9.
See supra Figure 9.
One manner in which a minor CFAA offense can be converted into a felony is by
incorporating a violation of state cybercrime law. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see Orin Kerr,
Obama’s Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14/obamas-proposed-changesto-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deep-dive/ [https://perma.cc/2465-PTZ2] (explaining how state
cybercrime statutes often overlap with CFAA); Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law,
A Desperately Needed Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013),
http://www.wired.com/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/ [https://perma.cc /C8AL-UC26] (noting
that “a prosecutor can seek to inflate potential sentences by stacking new charges atop violations of
state laws”). Another avenue for converting a minor CFAA offense into a felony is to charge the
expansive fraud provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), or one of the damage provisions, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C). For an explanation about how sentencing enhancement factors can easily apply
in cybercrime cases, see Hanni Fakhoury, How the Sentencing Guidelines Work Against Defendants in
CFAA Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/41-months-weev-understanding-how-sentencing-guidelines-work-cfaacases-0 [https://perma.cc/U3PC-R9YF] (critiquing the use of an enhancement factor targeted
specifically at CFAA crimes).
105
106
107
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D. What Fact Patterns Are Litigated Under Cybercrime Law?
The longitudinal data are probative of how civil plaintiffs and criminal
prosecutors have invoked cybercrime law, but they are certainly not
conclusive. In this Section, I turn to a detailed latitudinal analysis, using a
new, comprehensive dataset of 2012 federal cybercrime pleadings.
With this novel dataset, it is possible to definitively answer additonal
foundational questions about the function of federal cybercrime law: Who
invokes CFAA and under what circumstances? The following subsections
examine these questions, first for civil litigation, then for criminal prosecutions.
1. Civil Litigation
a. Party Relationships
Civil defendants appear nothing like the outsider rogues that initially
captivated Congress and state legislatures, as demonstrated by Table 1.
Table 1: Party Relationships in Civil CFAA Filings
Relationship Between Plaintiff(s)
and Defendant(s)

Number of
Filings

Employee, Consultant, or Contractor
Competitor
Technology Service Provider
Derivative Business
Business Partner
Doe(s)
No Substantial Relationship
Customer or User
Employer

162 (50%)
97 (30%)
42 (13%)
29 (9%)
24 (7%)
22 (7%)
16 (5%)
8 (2%)
6 (2%)
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The overwhelming majority of private cybercrime claims arise in business
disputes (238, 73%),108 and of those, most follow from previous employment (168,
52%).109 Just a small minority of claims (38, 12%) are filed against strangers.110
An analysis of party relationship coincidence confirms that cybercrime
law most often intermediates routine commercial quarrels. There is scant
overlap between categories associated with business and those associated with
hacker stereotypes; these are not cases in which former employees or
competitors have aligned with unrelated, serial computer abusers. Rather,
civil CFAA litigation involves one-off commercial disputes that happen to
involve information technology.
Table 2: Party Relationship Coincidence in Civil CFAA Filings

The data on party relationships, seen in Table 2, reveal a notable trend in
litigation: a cybercrime claim against a competitor is often accompanied by a
cybercrime claim against a former employee (76, 78%).111 These cases reflect
departed staff who have either established their own firms or joined preexisting
competitors. Cybercrime law is merely a novel federal twist in these cases, which
have historically been adjudicated under contract, trade secret, or agency law.
b. Underlying Conduct
The overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime claims also look nothing
like “hacking,” even construed broadly, as shown in Table 3.
108 Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Business Dispute) / (All Civil Filings)). In describing the
latitudinal data throughout this Article, I use the following logic notation to reflect operations on
the civil and criminal datasets: (1) “∧” for “and,” (2) “∨” for “or,” and (3) “¬” for “
not.” The symbol “/” represents division of the sum of records matching the numerator by the sum of
records matching the denominator. The symbol “–” represents the difference between the sum of records
matching the minuend and the sum of records matching the subtrahend.
109 See id. ((Business Dispute ∧ Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Business
Dispute)).
110 See id. ((Unrelated Parties) / (All Civil Filings)).
111 See id. ((Competitor ∧ Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Competitor)).
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Table 3: Conduct Alleged in Civil CFAA Filings
Conduct

Number of Filings

Misappropriating Information
Editing or Deleting Information
Invasion of Privacy
Accessing Another Person’s Account
Financial Misfeasance
Hijacking Another Person’s Account
Impersonation
Misappropriating a Computer System
Mobile Phone Unlocking
Software Disruption of a Computer System
Credential Sharing
Harassment
Unrelated Website
Copyright Trolling
Spam Calls or Email
Malware
Reverse Engineering
Physical Disruption of a Computer System
Automated Website Interaction
Modifications to Enterprise Software

170 (52%)
71 (22%)
41 (13%)
40 (12%)
26 (8%)
26 (8%)
20 (6%)
18 (6%)
16 (5%)
14 (4%)
11 (3%)
11 (3%)
9 (3%)
8 (2%)
7 (2%)
6 (2%)
6 (2%)
5 (2%)
5 (2%)
5 (2%)

Most private claims relate to information misappropriation (170, 52%),112
or modification or deletion (71, 22%).113 The categories substantially overlap,
and together represent a majority of claims (182, 56%).114 These findings
indicate that civil cybercrime works as a quasi-intellectual property regime,
far less concerned with the function and integrity of computer systems than
with their information contents.
Only a minority of claims could be reasonably characterized as involving
the circumvention of a technical protection measure (99, 30%).115 Furthermore,
even within these cases that involve technical circumvention, the most common
avenues for unauthorized access are password theft (53, 54%),116 mobile phone
See id. ((Misappropriating Information) / (All Civil Filings)).
See id. ((Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings)).
See id. ((Misappropriating Information ∨ Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings).
See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Civil Filings)).
See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's
Account – Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's Account
with a Technical Circumvention Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).
112
113
114
115
116
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unlocking (16, 16%),117 and password sharing (11, 11%).118 Civil cybercrime
cases, in short, do not arise from technically sophisticated “breaking and
entering.”119
There is remarkably little commonality in the long tail of fact patterns.
Claims present a hodgepodge of theories favoring liability, ranging from
online harassment (11, 3%)120 to hosting an unrelated website (9, 3%)121 to
scraping online material (5, 2%).122 Cybercrime use in copyright trolling (8,
2%)123 and bulk mobile phone unlocking cases (16, 5%)124 suggests the law has
been opportunistically seized upon for non-adversarial litigation.125
2. Criminal Litigation
a. Victim–Defendant Relationships
Most criminal charges, like most civil claims, arise from a preexisting
relationship, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Victim-Defendant Relationships in CFAA Prosecutions126
Relationship Between Defendant and Victim

Number of Defendants

Employee, Consultant, or Contractor
No Substantial Relationship
Colleague
Social or Familial Relation
Technology Service
Business Partner
Customer or User
Doe(s)

64 (48%)
41 (30%)
9 (7%)
5 (4%)
5 (4%)
4 (3%)
3 (2%)
3 (2%)

117 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (Circumvention
of a Technical Protection)).
118 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∧ Credential Sharing) / (Circumvention of a
Technical Protection)).
119 Contra H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706
(“The conduct prohibited [in CFAA] is analogous to that of ‘breaking and entering’ rather than
using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense.”).
120 See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Harassment) / (All Civil Filings)).
121 See id. ((Unrelated Website) / (All Civil Filings)).
122 See id. ((Automated Website Interaction) / (All Civil Filings)).
123 See id. ((Copyright Trolling) / (All Civil Filings)).
124 See id. ((Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (All Civil Filings)).
125 See generally Civil Dataset, supra note 86.
126 Criminal Dataset, supra note 86.
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And, like with civil claims, the majority of criminal charges relate to an
employment or commercial dispute (76, 57%).127
These findings squarely deflate the myth that most cybercrime defendants
align with hacker archetypes (i.e., repeat offenders motivated by sport, profit, or
national pride). Instead, most criminal cases arise from one-time misconduct, in
which an underlying dispute migrates from the real world to the Internet.
The criminal prosecution data reveal, however, one notable departure
from civil practice: although still a minority, cases in which there is no
relationship between the defendant and victim, or where the defendant is
unidentified, occur about three times as often in criminal prosecutions as in
civil suits (44, 33%).128
b. Underlying Conduct
Criminal cases, much like civil cases, tend not to arise from sophisticated
hacking, as seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Conduct Alleged in Criminal CFAA Filings 129
Conduct

Misappropriating Information
Accessing Another Person’s Account
Financial Misfeasance
Editing or Deleting Information
Malware
Software Disruption of a Computer System
Unspecified Breaking In
Hijacking Another Person’s Account

Number of
Defendants

82 (62%)
47 (35%)
32 (24%)
18 (14%)
17 (13%)
14 (11%)
13 (10%)
11 (8%)

About half of prosecutions do not involve technical circumvention of an
access control (65, 49%).130 And, among those cases that do involve a
circumvention of a technological protection, many of the fact patterns do not
reflect technical sophistication but rather password theft (32, 47%).131
127 See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∨ Business Partner ∨ Colleague ∨
Customer or User ∨ Competitor) / (All Criminal Defendants)).
128 See id. ((Doe(s) ∨ No Substantial Relationship) / (All Criminal Defendants)).
129 Criminal Dataset, supra note 86.
130 See id. ((All Criminal Defendants – Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Criminal
Defendants)).
131 See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection – Circumvention of a Technical Protection
Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).
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These results belie the narrative that federal prosecutors generally reserve
cybercrime charges for the worst offenders, namely serial and sophisticated
computer hackers.132 In fact, prosecutors routinely file cybercrime charges for
minor misconduct, especially when a current or former employee misappropriates
information (51, 39%).133
One substantial point of divergence between civil and criminal litigation is
the extent to which government computer systems are involved. Nearly all the
civil cases in the dataset related to computer systems owned by private
individuals or businesses.134 In the criminal cases, by contrast, roughly a quarter
of charges related to a government computer system (38, 29%).135 Most of the
defendants in these cases were current or former government employees who
had technically valid credentials for a system, but misused the system (21,
55%).136 Remarkably, among those cases where a government employee
repurposed their access to a workplace computer system, the most common
class of defendant consisted of law enforcement personnel (12, 57%).137
E. Is Cybercrime Law Redundant?
Cybercrime law is not monolithic. Federal and state legislatures have
enacted a diverse array of offenses and have drafted those offenses with a wide
range of textual variations.138 The current CFAA, for instance, contains
(depending on how one counts) up to fourteen different statutory offenses.139
The structure of cybercrime law generates the potential for two different
types of redundancy. First, a cybercrime offense might be internally redundant,
132 But cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington Jenny A. Durkan Testifies
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, JUST. NEWS (May 8, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/us-attorney-western-district-washington-jenny-durkan-testifies-senate-judiciary
[https://perma.cc/25MF-TZCB] (highlighting federal prosecutorial successes in cybercrime cases despite the
“increases in the skills of threat actors and the complexity of their organizations”).
133 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧
Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).
134 Civil Dataset, supra note 86.
135 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Government Computer System) / (All
Criminal Defendants)).
136 See id. ((Government Computer System ∧ Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention
of a Technical Protection)) / (Government Computer System)).
137 See id. ((Government Computer System ∧ Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention
of a Technical Protection) ∧ Law Enforcement Personnel) / (Government Computer System ∧
Misappropriating Information ∧ ¬ (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).
138 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780, 2010 WL 3291750, at *912 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (holding that “permission” under the California cybercrime statute has
a different meaning than “authorization” under the federal statute); see also United States v.
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 534 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014) (suggesting that “without authorization, or in
excess of authorization” under the New Jersey statute has a different meaning than “without
authorization or exceeds authorized access” under the federal statute).
139 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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overlapping with other cybercrime offenses within the same statutory scheme.
Second, a cybercrime offense might be externally redundant, overlapping with
noncybercrime civil claims or criminal charges.
This Section examines the extent to which cybercrime is both internally and
externally redundant. It begins with civil claims before turning to criminal charges.
1. Civil Litigation
a. Internal Redundancy
Many pleadings invoke cybercrime law only generally and fail to identify
particular statutory claims (123, 38%).140 These plaintiffs treat CFAA as a
single type of liability, blurring the various offenses. One plausible
interpretation is that attorneys simply fail to understand the federal statute’s
structure. Alternatively, practitioners may view cybercrime law as so
internally duplicative that particularized claiming is unnecessary. A more
cynical view is that many courts tolerate this vague pleading practice, thus
providing little incentive for plaintiffs to furnish detail.
CFAA’s structure provides a limited natural experiment for evaluating
whether attorneys are confused by the statutory scheme or are pleading
strategically. In civil practice, statutory claims for unintentional damage to a
computer are markedly easier to prove than claims for reckless damage to a
computer, and both claims provide identical remedies.141 Nevertheless, a
nontrivial share of filings (55, 27%) include a reckless damage claim.142 Most
of these pleadings also include an unintentional damage claim (42, 76%), such
that the reckless damage claim is merely duplicative.143 But a meaningful
share of reckless damage pleadings do not include an unintentional damage
claim (13, 24%),144 a result that can only be explained by attorney confusion.
So, this much is certain: a fair number of practitioners are befuddled by
cybercrime law.
Within the subset of filings that are more precise about statutory claims
(202, 62%),145 a substantial majority reference multiple provisions (142, 70%),
as shown in Figure 10.

See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Unspecified Claims / All Civil Claims)).
CFAA plaintiffs usually must show $5000 in “loss” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (g) and
(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). As a result, in civil cases, the reckless “damage” offense in (a)(5)(B) is ordinarily
strictly harder to prove than the “damage and loss” offense in (a)(5)(C).
142 See infra Table 6 ((1030(a)(5)(B) / (All Civil Claims)).
143 See infra Table 7 ((1030(a)(5)(B) ∧ 1030(a)(5)(C) / (1030(a)(5)(B)).
144 See id. ((1030(a)(5)(B) ∧ ¬ 1030(a)(5)(C)) / (1030(a)(5)(B).
145 See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((¬ Unspecified CFAA Claims) / (All Civil Claims)).
140
141
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Figure 10: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings

These findings strongly suggest that CFAA’s various provisions greatly
overlap. Most plaintiffs who plead with specificity believe their fact pattern
could be styled as a violation of more than one statutory offense.
Pleadings most commonly cite CFAA’s taking information and fraud
offenses, as would be expected given their broad judicial constructions.146 The
unintentional damage and loss provision is also widely invoked, suggesting
plaintiffs recognize the broad and overlapping interpretations of “damage”
and “loss” that some courts have adopted.
Table 6: Frequency of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings
Civil Claim

Taking Information
Fraud
Damage and Loss
Reckless Damage
Intentional Damage
Trafficking in Passwords
Unspecified Damage
Taking Financial Information
Extortion

Statutory
Provision

Filings with

(a)(2)(C)
(a)(4)
(a)(5)(C)
(a)(5)(B)
(a)(5)(A)
(a)(6)(A)
(a)(5)
(a)(2)(A)
(a)(7)

136 (67%)
111 (55%)
96 (48%)
55 (27%)
48 (24%)
23 (11%)
18 (9%)
4 (2%)
2 (1%)

a Claim

146 As an aside, CFAA incorporates an unusual cause of action for password trafficking, and
plaintiffs have found a way to put even this to use. Most of these cases arise from mobile phone
unlocking (13, 57%) or voluntary password sharing (6, 26%). Id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ Mobile Phone
Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A))); id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ Credential Sharing) / (1030(a)(6)(A))).
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Claiming coincidence under CFAA lends further credence to the view
that the statute is internally redundant, as seen in Table 7. There are
extraordinarily high rates of coclaiming across CFAA’s broadest provisions.
Table 7: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings
(18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012))

Several areas of claiming coincidence warrant note. First, the taking
information and fraud offenses frequently coincide,147 likely because courts
have watered down key elements of CFAA’s fraud offense.
Second, the various “damage” claims commonly are coupled with a taking
information or a fraud claim.148 These filings reflect jurisprudence that broadly
interprets “damage” to encompass mundane copying or modifying data.149
Third, the overwhelming majority of password trafficking claims are
paired with fraud claims (20, 87%).150 Much, but not all, of the overlap arises
from copy-and-paste complaints in mobile phone unlocking disputes (13,
65%).151 The theory of these cases seems to be, in part, that use of another
person’s password is inherently fraudulent. If viable, this theory renders the
password trafficking offense largely redundant as against the fraud offense.
b. External Redundancy
Private cybercrime claims are usually bundled with a passel of other
causes of action, as shown in Figure 11.

See supra Table 7.
See supra Table 7.
Civil Dataset, supra note 86. Measured slightly differently, within the subset of filings that
included any (a)(5) claim (137, 68%), a slight majority involved information misappropriation,
modification, or deletion (69, 50%).
150 See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ 1030(a)(4)) / (1030(a)(6)(A))).
151 See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) ∧ 1030(a)(4) ∧ Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A) ∧
1030(a)(4))).
147
148
149
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Figure 11: Number of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

This high rate of coclaiming buttresses the theory that, in civil litigation,
CFAA and conventional bases of liability are usually redundant. Plaintiffs
evidently believe they have a broad range of colorable theories for recovery.
As demonstrated in Table 8, the most frequent cybercrime coclaims are
broad, state common law causes of action.
Table 8: Frequency of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

Non-CFAA Claim

Source of
Law
Contract
State
Unfair Business Practices
State
Trade Secret
State
Conversion
State
Tortious Interference
State
Fiduciary Duty
State
Unjust Enrichment
State
State
Civil Conspiracy
Stored Communications Act Federal
Computer Trespass
State
Fraud
State
Federal
Trademark
Wiretap Act
Federal
State
Trespass to Chattels
Federal
Copyright
Privacy Tort
State
Defamation
State
State
Negligence
Wiretap Statute
State

Filings with
a Claim
161 (50%)
138 (42%)
131 (40%)
126 (39%)
125 (38%)
115 (35%)
89 (27%)
86 (26%)
67 (21%)
63 (19%)
62 (19%)
56 (17%)
54 (16%)
44 (14%)
36 (11%)
27 (8%)
21 (6%)
17 (5%)
15 (5%)

1490

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1452

This result is consistent with the theory that courts have adapted
conventional tort and property claims to technology, making dedicated,
computer-specific causes of action less necessary.
The leading civil coclaims also reinforce the conclusion that civil cybercrime
mediates commercial grievances, not sophisticated computer intrusions. Claims
grounded in contract, unfair business practices, and fiduciary duty appear in the
overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime cases152—and necessarily arise from
business and employment relationships.153
Comparing claiming coincidence across CFAA and non-CFAA causes of
action reveals that this external redundancy is not unique to specific
cybercrime offenses, as demonstrated by Table 9.
Table 9: Coincidence Between the Most Common CFAA
and Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

Litigants invoke the same state common law causes of action, regardless of
whether their cybercrime claim arises from a taking information, fraud, or
damage theory.154
A final observation is how many cases are in federal court solely based on
a CFAA claim. A slight majority of filings do not include any federal claim
other than CFAA (166, 51%).155 While plaintiffs in some of these cases could
assuredly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the high proportion strongly implies
that many CFAA plaintiffs rely upon the statute as a hook for federal subject
matter jurisdiction, and many of these disputes would end up in state court
but for CFAA.156
See infra Table 9.
Claims for trade secret theft, conversion, and tortious interference suggest an underlying
commercial dispute, but are not so conclusive. A hacker breaching a system and obtaining
information could be liable under trade secret or conversion theories for misappropriating
confidential business information. An intentional disruption of a commercial computer system could
be actionable as tortious interference since the aim is interfering with ongoing and prospective
business operations.
154 Civil Dataset, supra note 86.
155 Id. ((¬Other Federal Claims) / (All Civil Claims)).
156 Some courts have recognized CFAA usage as a strategic mechanism for federal subject
matter jurisdiction and have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over associated state law
152
153
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2. Criminal Prosecutions
a. Internal Redundancy
At first glance, CFAA’s internal redundancy appears significantly less
pronounced in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases.157 Prosecutors
uniformly reference specific provisions of CFAA, and the overwhelming
majority of defendants are accused of violating just one of CFAA’s statutory
offenses (100, 75%), as illustrated by Figure 12.

Figure 12: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions

Prosecutors thus appear to be exercising restraint in cybercrime cases.
Even in fact patterns where judicial constructions of CFAA would allow for
charging under multiple statutory provisions, prosecutors rarely invoke more
than one type of offense. The result also suggests that prosecutors make a
meaningful effort to distinguish between various cybercrime offenses.
There is, though, a cynical alternative reading of this result. Prosecutors
can already easily obtain a maximum five-year sentence under CFAA’s broad
taking-information provision.158 An additional conviction for fraud or damage
would likely carry the same maximum sentence and would be subject to the
claims. See, e.g., Landmark Credit Union v. Doberstein, 746 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993-94 (E.D. Wis.
2010) (stating that plaintiff ’s claim “borders on the frivolous” and is “an attempt to artificially create
federal jurisdiction”); Contemporary Serv. Corp. v. Hartman, No. 08-02967, 2008 WL 3049891, at
*3-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008) (discussing the differences in what plaintiffs must prove for CFAA
claims in comparison to state law claims).
157 This criminal charging analysis provides equivalent treatment to principal, attempt,
accomplice, and conspiracy charges under each CFAA provision, since the purpose of the analysis
is to compare the scope and invocation of CFAA’s various provisions.
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (2012) (setting a five-year maximum sentence for CFAA’s
taking information offenses, so long as prosecutors can establish any of several straightforward
enhancements).
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same sentencing guidelines. And, since the charges arise from the same
conduct, sentences would likely run concurrently.159 Additionally, if the
underlying theories for various offenses overlap too extensively, courts might
invalidate the charges on Double Jeopardy Clause grounds.160 Accordingly, if
prosecutors make charging determinations to obtain the greatest possible
punishment, they would have little incentive to charge under multiple CFAA
provisions. Prosecutors would instead charge under just the offense that is
both the easiest to prove and most punitive.161
Results on charging coincidence (Table 10) do not, unfortunately, aid in
selecting between these competing hypotheses of prosecutorial behavior.
Table 10: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal
Prosecutions (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012))

As seen in Table 10, there are generally low levels of charging coincidence
across the statutory provisions. That could be because of prosecutorial
restraint and careful statutory interpretation, or it could be due to crass
calculations about sentencing.
Examining the frequency of specific CFAA offenses, in Table 11, sheds
more light on prosecutorial strategy.162 The most common CFAA criminal
159 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (recommending concurrent sentencing).
160 Cf. United States v. Cioni, 649 F.3d 276, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2011) (invalidating a CFAA felony
enhancement for a Stored Communications Act violation, pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment).
161 There are substantial policy consequences if this alternative theory is accurate. If Congress
or the courts narrowed the taking information offense, prosecutors could respond by charging the
fraud and intentional damage offenses with greater frequency.
162 Two absences from criminal charging practice warrant brief mention. First, prosecutors
made almost no use of CFAA’s password trafficking provision. See infra Table 11. Since a substantial
proportion of the Internet’s underground economy involves stolen login credentials, the omission
reaffirms that law enforcement has had difficulty reaching sophisticated offenders.
CFAA’s unintentional damage and loss offense is also missing from criminal practice. See infra
Table 11. Apparently, the Department of Justice did not file a single charge under that provision in
2012. See infra Table 11. A likely explanation is that the statutory elements include intentional
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charge parallels the most common civil claim: taking information.163 That
result comes as little surprise, since the taking information offense is the
broadest in the statute.
Table 11: Frequency of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions
Charge
(Principal, Attempt,
Accomplice, or
Conspiracy Liability)

Taking Information
Intentional Damage
Fraud
Taking Federal Information
Reckless Damage
Extortion
Trafficking in Passwords
Taking Financial Information
Accessing a Federal System
Unintentional Damage and Loss

Statutory
Provision

1030(a)(2)(C)
1030(a)(5)(A)
1030(a)(4)
1030(a)(2)(B)
1030(a)(5)(B)
1030(a)(7)
1030(a)(6)(A)
1030(a)(2)(A)
1030(a)(3)
1030(a)(5)(C)

Defendants

63 (47%)
49 (37%)
24 (18%)
15 (11%)
9 (7%)
7 (5%)
5 (4%)
3 (2%)
1 (1%)
0 (0%)

In a departure from the practices of private plaintiffs, however, prosecutors less
frequently allege CFAA’s broad fraud offense.164 Criminal defendants face a fraud
charge at roughly a third the frequency that plaintiffs include a fraud claim.165
This result suggests that prosecutors are making a greater effort than private
litigants to distinguish among fraud theories of cybercrime liability. Prosecutors
appear to generally treat CFAA fraud as a species of financial fraud—most cases
directly involve either financial misconduct (11, 46%)166 or a financial institution or
agency (12, 50%).167
Another departure from civil practice is how prosecutors have invoked
CFAA’s intentional damage offense. Criminal defendants face a charge under
that provision roughly half more often than civil cases invoke it. What’s more,

unauthorized access. If prosecutors can already clear that mental state hurdle, they can likely
demonstrate that the subsequent damage or loss was reckless or intentional.
163 See infra Table 11.
164 See supra Table 11.
165 Compare supra Table 11, with supra Table 6.
166 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) ∧ Financial
Misfeasance) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)).
167 See id. ((Financial Institution Computer System) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)).
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most of the cases under that provision involve either a circumvention of a
technical protection (35, 71%)168 or a software disruption (11, 22%).169
At a high level, this result indicates that part of CFAA is functioning as
intended. Cases under CFAA’s intentional damage provision map closely
onto archetypal computer abuse of the sort that Congress and state
legislatures emphasized when they enacted cybercrime statutes.
Looking more closely at fact patterns, though, prosecutors are not treating
the intentional damage offense as a distinct theory of cybercrime liability.
Most criminal cases involving CFAA’s intentional damage offense appear
much better characterized by the statute’s taking information offense. While
prosecutors have made a meaningful effort at distinguishing CFAA’s fraud
offense, they have treated the intentional damage offense as a catchall.
A likely explanation for why prosecutors are lumping fact patterns into
the intentional damage offense is that it has uniquely enhanced sentencing
consequences. As a statutory matter, the intentional damage offense is
automatically associated with a maximum sentence of ten years.170 And, under
the federal sentencing guidelines, intentional damage automatically increases
a defendant’s recommended period of incarceration.171
In sum, prosecutors appear to exhibit complex strategic behavior in
distinguishing cybercrime offenses. Where there is little or no sentencing
difference, prosecutors are exercising much greater restraint than civil
plaintiffs. They usually charge just one type of violation, and they usually
select an appropriate theory.
Where there is a sentencing difference, though, prosecutors are blurring
the distinctions between cybercrime offenses. They tend to charge just one
type of violation—but they often charge the violation associated with
substantially enhanced punishment, not the violation that best fits the
defendant’s conduct.
b. External Redundancy
Only a slight majority of CFAA prosecutions involve at least one
non-CFAA charge (69, 52%).172

168 See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) ∧ Circumvention of a Technical
Protection) / (1030(a)(5) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).
169 See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) ∧ Software Disruption of a Computer
System) / (1030(a)(5)(A) ∨ 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).
170 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(B)(i).
171 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (directing an offense enhancement of four levels where the charge is intentional damage).
172 See infra Figure 13 ((Count of defendants with › 1 non-CFAA charge) / (All Criminal Defendants).
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Figure 13: Number of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions

What’s more, among prosecutions that involve archetypal computer
abuse—circumvention of a technical protection or disabling a computer
system—most defendants face only CFAA charges (45, 58%).173 This result
stands in stark contrast to civil litigation practice. In criminal law, cybercrime
offenses are fairly unique.174 Examining the frequency of specific criminal
charges, seen in Table 12, sheds more light on prosecutorial strategy.

173 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Circumvention of a Technical Protection ∨ Software
Disruption of a Computer System) ∧ Only CFAA Charges) / (Circumvention of a Technical
Protection ∨ Software Disruption of a Computer System)).
174 An alternative interpretation, that prosecutors are strategically charging solely cybercrime
offenses because they are the most punitive and easiest to prove, would also be consistent with this
data. But examining the federal criminal statutes controverts that hypothesis—there are not lesser
federal offenses that would generally reach archetypal computer abuse.
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Table 12: Frequency of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions
Non-CFAA Charge
(Principal, Attempt, Accomplice,
or Conspiracy Liability)

Statutory
Provision

Identity Theft

18 U.S.C.
§§ 1028, 1028A
(2012)
18 U.S.C. § 1343
18 U.S.C. § 1344
18 U.S.C. § 1029

30 (23%)

18 U.S.C. § 1962

9 (7%)

18 U.S.C. § 1001

7 (5%)

42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-6

4 (3%)

Wire Fraud
Bank Fraud
Access Device (Production,
Trafficking, Possession, or Use)
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)
Conspiracy
False Statements to a Federal
Official
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Disclosure

Defendants

23 (17%)
22 (17%)
16 (12%)

The commonality between these cocharged offenses is that they are all (but
one) accompanied by higher maximum or recommended sentences than the most
frequent cybercrime offenses.175 Where prosecutors do file a noncybercrime
charge, then, they appear motivated by sentencing considerations.
The most common cocharge, identity theft, would seem to be an odd
pairing for cybercrime offenses. The text of the statutory scheme primarily
contemplates conventional identity theft involving forged documents.176 But
about half of cybercrime cases involving an identity theft charge arise from
accessing another person’s account on an online service (15, 50%).177 The
underlying statutory interpretation appears to be that entering another user’s
login and password constitutes an actionable form of identity theft.
This result bolsters the theory raised earlier that prosecutors strategically
blur statutory offenses where enhanced sentences are available. In a plain
reading of text and legislative history, the federal identity theft statute was
175 The offense for false statements to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, carries the same
maximum and recommended sentences as the most common cybercrime offenses. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). Compare
18 U.S.C. § 1028(b)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B).
176 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a), 1028A(a), (c).
177 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Identity Theft ∨ Identity Theft Conspiracy) ∧ Accessing
Another Person’s Account Without Permission) / (Identity Theft ∨ Identity Theft Conspiracy)).
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intended to cover a distinct set of fact patterns from its neighboring computer
abuse statute.178 But identity theft offenses are accompanied by substantial
and automatic sentence enhancements, so prosecutors have also styled
computer abuse to fit within these identity theft offenses.179
A notable omission from the top cybercrime cocharges is the federal trade
secret statute, part of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).180 Given that so many
criminal prosecutions involve employees absconding with business information
(51, 38%),181 one would expect many cases to include trade secret counts. But there
was only one CFAA case in 2012 that included an EEA count (1, 1%).182
A partial explanation is that nearly half of these employee prosecutions
arise from government employment (23, 45%),183 where trade secret
protection is not available. As for the remainder, it is possible that prosecutors
view the (slight) sentencing increases associated with a trade secret charge as
offset by the (significant) additional offense elements.184

178 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (framing most offenses in terms of “identification documents” and
“authentication features”); id. § 1028A (explicitly omitting CFAA as an overlapping offense for
purposes of aggravated identity theft). The early legislative history of section 1028 centered on
forged identification paperwork. See False Identification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 19 (1982) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (highlighting fraudulent identification in
association with check forgery, travel, and firearm purchasing). Later expansion of the statute,
including the provisions that (arguably) reach computer credentials, focused on identity theft and
associated financial fraud. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4-9 (1998); Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1, 2 (1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (emphasizing identity theft
arrests and financial losses).
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b)(1)(D) (imposing maximum sentence of fifteen years for identity
theft if a defendant obtains $1,000 in value within one year); id. § 1028A(b)(2) (imposing mandatory
two-year, non-concurrent sentence enhancement for aggravated identity theft); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (suggesting automatic
enhancement to recommended sentence for identity theft offenses).
180 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
181 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧
Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).
182 See id. ((Trade Secret Theft) / (All Criminal Defendants)).
183 See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor ∧ Misappropriating
Information ∧ Government Computer System) / (Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or
Distributor ∧ Misappropriating Information)).
184 The trade secret provisions of the EEA include a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832(a), but are subject to the same sentencing guidelines as common CFAA offenses, U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(11) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
Moreover, the EEA trade secret offense incorporates a number of additional elements, including
reasonable measures to maintain secrecy and independent economic value on account of secrecy. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 1832, 1839; Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 49 (2011)
(statement of Professor Orin S. Kerr) (“Establishing a theft of trade secrets requires proving all the
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An examination of specific charge coincidence, as demonstrated by Table
13, lends further support to the earlier observations about cybercrime’s
uniqueness, as well as how prosecutors are charging identity theft and fraud
offenses.
Table 13: Coincidence Between the Most Common CFAA and Non-CFAA
Charges in Criminal Prosecutions

The cybercrime offenses that relate to taking information from a federal
government computer, and recklessly damaging a computer, have near-zero
charge coincidence. In these areas of misconduct, CFAA provides especially
unique criminal law coverage.
The high coincidence between information misappropriation charges and
identity theft charges reaffirms that prosecutors are strategically invoking identity
theft offenses to secure sentencing enhancements. These are fundamentally
computer abuse cases, involving account break-ins.
Finally, CFAA fraud charges are frequently paired with wire fraud or bank
fraud charges (12, 50%).185 This result further confirms that, in prosecutorial
practice, cybercrime fraud is largely a species of conventional financial fraud.
F. Does Cybercrime Law Deter Computer Abuse?
In a conventional quantitative evaluation of deterrence, a cybercrime offender
is motivated by the potential gain associated with misconduct, less the sentence
imposed by criminal law, discounted by the probability of successful prosecution.186

elements of the crime, and that can be a difficult task. In contrast, proving [under CFAA] that an
employee did something for reasons other than official company business is vastly easier.”).
185 See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) ∧ (Wire Fraud
∨ Wire Fraud Conspiracy ∨ Bank Fraud)) / (1030(a)(4) ∨ 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)) .
186 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-79
(1968) (offering a theoretical approach to measuring deterrence based on the number of offenses a
criminal would commit, the probability of conviction per offense, and “a portmanteau variable
representing all . . . other influences”); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1201-05 (1985) (justifying criminal sanctions based on the need to impose optimal
deterrence for such offenses, which pecuniary penalties alone cannot achieve).
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Available datasets on cybercrime are not sufficiently comprehensive or detailed
to credibly estimate these values for individual offenders. It is possible, though, to
compute aggregate metrics of how cybercrime law deters cybercrime offenses.
One simple measurement is a comparison of total cybercrime gains to total
cybercrime sentences in a given year. The result is a very rough approximation of
expected punishment relative to the incentive to commit cybercrime.
Expected Punishmentyear =

Total Punishmentyear
Total Gainsyear

A slightly more sophisticated measurement takes advantage of cybercrime
time series data by treating year-to-year changes as natural experiments. By
comparing the volume of punishment in sequential years, it is possible to—
again, very roughly—estimate the marginal punishment imposed by
cybercrime law relative to the incentives for cybercrime. In intuitive terms,
this measure reflects how responsive the criminal justice system is to changes
in cybercrime volume.
Marginal Punishmentyear

=

Total Punishmentyear - Total Punishmentyear - 1
Total Gainsyear Total Gainsyear - 1

Prosecution data from the Department of Justice are reasonably accurate
and are sufficient to calculate the numerators in these equations. The
denominators, by contrast, are much more difficult to obtain. Data sources on
gains and losses associated with cybercrime are notoriously unreliable,187 and
many high-profile breaches are associated with nonmonetary motives.
In the interest of generating highly defensible figures, I conservatively
estimate the gains from cybercrime as those solely due to domestic credit card
fraud.188 I also liberally estimate the punishment associated with cybercrime
by including not just CFAA offenses, but also federal identity theft and access
device offenses.

187 See Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (critiquing prior attempts at
quantifying cybercrime as inconsistent and inaccurate), in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 265, 267 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); Dinei Florêncio & Cormac Herley,
Sex, Lies and Cyber-Crime Surveys (noting survey errors in attempts to quantify cybercrime), in
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY AND PRIVACY III 35, 37 (Bruce Schneier ed., 2013).
188 The underlying data on credit card fraud are sourced from a regular financial newsletter
that maintains a longitudinal fraud dataset. See Card Fraud Losses Reach $16.31 Billion, NILSON REP.
(HSN Consultants, Inc., Carpinteria, CA), July 2015, at 5, 10 (reporting trends in credit card fraud
from the 1990s onwards). For purposes of the marginal punishment metric, movement in credit card
fraud functions as a rough proxy for movement in the overall level of cybercrime.
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Figure 14: Deterrence Effects of Federal Cybercrime Law
(Months Incarcerated Per $100,000)

Even with these exceedingly generous assumptions—likely underestimating
incentives and overestimating punishments by orders of magnitude—the results
are unequivocal. If a would-be offender can expect to earn (very roughly and
conservatively) $100,000 and serve just one month in prison, and if punishment
levels are far outpaced by incentive growth, then cybercrime law cannot
meaningfully deter cybercrime.
G. Assessing the Two Perspectives on Cybercrime Law
In civil cybercrime litigation, the critical perspective has strong empirical
support. The volume of litigation has radically increased, and the
overwhelming majority of claims do not arise from sophisticated hacking.
Rather, cases relate to mundane commercial disputes that happen to involve
computers. Considerable evidence indicates that civil cybercrime liability is
duplicative of conventional private causes of action, and that private plaintiffs
greatly blur theories of cybercrime liability.
The data on criminal litigation are much more mixed. Cybercrime charges
increased from the 1990s to the 2000s, but then leveled off. Prison sentences
have shot up, but prosecutors continue to exercise substantial discretion over
whether to impose any incarceration. Prosecutors generally only charge under
one theory of cybercrime liability, but this is likely due to strategic sentencing
calculations. A little over half of criminal charges arise from archetypal
hacking activities, and prosecutors do succeed in occasionally prosecuting
serious offenders. But most defendants engage in unsophisticated and minor
misconduct, arising from an existing commercial, employment, or personal
relationship. In sum, the state of cybercrime prosecutorial practice is highly
nuanced, and neither perspective is descriptively accurate.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Several prescriptions follow naturally from this comprehensive empirical
portrait of cybercrime litigation. The data provide support for three readily
implementable proposals: congressional elimination of civil CFAA liability,
the establishment of clear Department of Justice enforcement priorities, and
a narrow interpretation of cybercrime statutes.189
A. Civil Liability
Providing private causes of action for cybercrime has proved to be a failed
experiment, spurring an explosion of highly redundant litigation.
The underlying cause of this phenomenon appears to be readily
discernable: Conventional employment and commercial disputes increasingly
involve information technology, are relatively straightforward to investigate,
and can generally be addressed through conventional legal processes.
Sophisticated hacks, by contrast, can be difficult to uncover and attribute, and
perpetrators will often be either outside the reach of United States courts or
judgment proof.190 In more precise policy terminology, private cybercrime
liability poses a fundamental target inefficiency.191 If cybercrime law even
cracks the door to mundane private controversies, they will naturally swamp
serious computer abuse cases.
The easy statutory fix is to eliminate private cybercrime causes of
action.192 Textual revisions are trivial to make, since cybercrime statutes were
drafted primarily as a set of criminal offenses.193 Private causes of action

189 This part focuses primarily on federal reforms in the interest of brevity and because the
data examined in this Article were exclusively federal. Nevertheless, these same recommendations
extend to state legislatures, prosecutors, and courts.
190 Notably, in a review of recent high-profile data breaches, almost none resulted in civil litigation
or criminal charges. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach [https://perma.cc/8EAG-U8N6] (providing a dataset of data
breach incidents).
191 See Robert S. Goldfarb, Compensating Victims of Policy Change, REG., Sept.–Oct. 1980, at 22,
24 (explaining the theory of target inefficiency).
192 Cf. Brenton, supra note 10, at 457-59 (recommending the partial repeal of CFAA’s private cause
of action); Cindy Cohn & Marcia Hofmann, Part 2: EFF’s Additional Improvements to Aaron’s Law,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/part-2-effsadditional-improvements-aarons-law [https://perma.cc/YP2Q-H5NC] (recommending the total repeal of
CFAA’s private cause of action, among other revisions); Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
is a Failed Experiment, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/thecomputer-fraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/HZK4-ZMXS] (same); Orin
Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2013), http://volokh.com/
2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030/ [https://perma.cc/8U7D-DQVT] (same).
193 See Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Simply stated,
the CFAA is a criminal statute focused on criminal conduct. The civil component is an afterthought.”).
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generally consist of secondary add-on provisions, which Congress and state
legislatures could simply repeal.194
B. Enforcement Priorities
Most federal cybercrime prosecutions arise from minor and technically
unsophisticated misconduct, especially employees misappropriating information.
There is, though, a meaningful subset of prosecutions that involves serious
computer abuse.
The Department of Justice should establish a clear cybercrime
enforcement policy to shift this balance.195 Where a fact pattern involves
special factors—for instance, technical sophistication, significant monetary
loss, or a federal computer system—federal prosecutors should consider filing
cybercrime charges. But where the circumstances are more mundane, such as
a commercial or employment dispute that happens to involve information
technology, the local United States Attorney’s Office should (at most) refer
the matter to state and municipal law enforcement agencies.196
An enforcement policy could also address concerns about cybercrime
overbreadth. Prosecutors rarely charge ordinary consumers, journalists, or
security researchers under cybercrime law—yet there is a widely perceived
legal risk for those communities.197 Department of Justice officials already
assert a lack of prosecutorial interest in those fact patterns; formalizing a
declination policy would go a long way toward allaying concerns.198
Finally, an enforcement policy could facilitate doctrinal clarity for
cybercrime law, enhancing conformity with the statutory scheme and
promoting predictability in criminal justice outcomes. Federal prosecutors do
currently appear to be making good-faith attempts at distinguishing
individual cybercrime offenses—but only where there is no sentencing
194 At the federal level, for instance, eliminating civil liability would simply require repealing
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
195 Cf. Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology [https://perma.cc/WTP3QMB6] (recommending that the Department of Justice adopt a narrow CFAA enforcement policy).
196 Cf. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Guidance Regarding Marijuana
Enforcement 3-4 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305829 1327
56857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7K-EU6D] (establishing Department of Justice enforcement
policy for marijuana offenses, such that state and local law enforcement have primary responsibility).
197 See supra Section I.B.
198 See, e.g., David Bitkower, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism,
JUST. NEWS (July 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-davidbitkower-delivers-testimony-senate-judiciary [https://perma.cc/7FKE-4WP6] (“The department has no
interest in prosecuting such harmless acts.”); Leslie R. Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and
Government Insiders, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/prosecutingprivacy-abuses-corporate-and-government-insiders [https://perma.cc/WVY6-KVFH] (“The Department of
Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use restrictions like these.”).
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advantage. The Department of Justice could easily provide guidance on which
statutory offenses are most appropriate for recurring fact patterns.199
C. Narrow Construction of CFAA
The courts are presently engaged in a debate about the appropriate scope of
federal cybercrime law. Since CFAA’s scoping provisions are so ambiguous,
courts have resorted to reading proverbial legislative history tea leaves. Some
conclude that Congress did not intend for CFAA to have broad reach, going far
beyond archetypal hacking;200 others conclude that Congress did contemplate
liability for mundane computer misuse, especially by employees.201
The empirical data on federal cybercrime litigation enable a powerful new
argument to be made from CFAA’s legislative history. Congress may have
intended to open the federal courthouse door—just a crack—to claims
involving routine and unsophisticated computer misconduct.202 But Congress
199 Cf. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1-58 (2010) (reviewing
components of CFAA for United States Attorneys).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a
narrower interpretation of CFAA “maintains the CFAA’s focus on hacking rather than turning it
into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate”); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d
929, 935-38 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (discussing the legislative history of CFAA at length to bolster its
conclusion that CFAA should not be read broadly); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d
962, 963-67 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“[T]he legislative history supports a narrow view of the CFAA.”); Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495-99 (D. Md.
2005) (relying on the legislative history of CFAA to interpret the statute).
201 See, e.g., NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(reviewing aspects of CFAA’s legislative history before adopting a broad view of the statute);
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127-29 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (relying on Senate Reports to construe CFAA broadly).
202 In my own reading of the legislative history, Congress did—ever so slightly—consider the
issue of unsophisticated employee liability. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996) (establishing
liability for “individuals who intentionally . . . abuse their authority to use . . . a computer and
thereby obtain information of minimal value”); Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm.
On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 104th Cong. 6 (1996) (statement of Sen. John Glenn)
(“Over the years, this Committee has examined threats to security and privacy as diverse as . . . IRS
employees browsing through taxpayer records . . . .”); id. at 326 (statement of Richard G. Power,
Editor, Computer Security Institute) (“Also, in recent weeks, it was revealed that several employees
of the Social Security Administration allegedly passed information on 11,000 people . . . to a credit
card fraud ring.”); Computer Fraud Legislation: Hearing on S.440 and S. 1678 Before the S. Subcomm. on
Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 35 (1985) (statement of Victoria Toensing,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.) (noting an incident where a former employee of the Federal Reserve
illicitly accessed money supply information on a computer system); Computer Crime and Computer
Security: Hearing on H.R. 1001 and H.R. 930 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime of the the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 30 (1985) (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.)
(discussing the potential for computer-based financial fraud by bank employees); id. at 149-150
(statement of Allan Robert Adler, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) (noting possible CFAA application
to government employees who use data for whistleblowing); id. at 213-14 (debating propriety of
employee liability for mishandling information); 98 CONG. REC. 31,992-93 (1984) (statement of
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did not intend to fling the door wide open, for so much run-of-the-mill
commercial litigation.203
Setting aside the merits of any individual case, the aggregate civil and
criminal caseloads under CFAA simply cannot be reconciled with a fair
reading of the legislative record.204 Nearly every cybercrime anecdote that
Congress considered, and nearly every statement in the record, presumed
legislation would reach archetypal hacking.205 There was almost no opposition
to CFAA expansion based on potential liability for employees, competitors,
or consumers.206 If the statute were intended to sweep as broadly as it does

Sen. Patrick Leahy)(criticizing CFAA for putting government employees at risk when
whistleblowing); id. at 32,083-84 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias) (proposing amendment to
CFAA that would restrict applicability to government employees).
203 Cf. Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (“The Court declines the invitation to open the doorway
to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language of the CFAA.”).
204 In addition to this aggregate legislative history argument, and a more conventional
legislative history argument, there are other reasons to narrowly construe CFAA. A broad
interpretation raises myriad issues, including the rule of lenity, due process void-for-vagueness
protections, nondelegation considerations, the expectation that Congress should speak clearly when
determining significant policy, federalism, and judicial economy. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d
508, 523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal in applying the rule of lenity); WEC Carolina Energy
Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (invoking
the rule of lenity in declining to extend CFAA to violations of a website’s terms of use); United
States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462-67 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that an interpretation of CFAA
that reaches conscious violations of a website’s terms of use is constitutionally void for vagueness);
Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“The Court declines the invitation to open
the doorway to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language
of the CFAA.”); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 137 (2014) (“A narrow interpretation of the
CFAA is the only way to ensure that the statute does not eclipse large portions of state law.”); Alden
Anderson, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Hacking into the Authorization Debate, 53
JURIMETRICS 447, 457-59 (2013) (contending that a broad interpretation of CFAA is inconsistent
with the historical division of cases between state and federal courts); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness:
Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 768-71 (2013)
(arguing CFAA violates nondelegation doctrine).
205 After an exhaustive review of committee hearings and reports on CFAA, I located only a
handful of anecdotal references to employees misappropriating information. See supra note 206.
Discussion of hacking, by contrast, pervades the legislative history.
206 From a review of the legislative history, it appears that vocal opposition to CFAA is a recent
phenomenon. Congressional hearings did not involve witnesses critical of CFAA’s scope until 2011,
and those witnesses were only invited after public interest advocacy. See Cyber Crime: Updating the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyber Space and Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (joint letter for the record from public interest
organizations); id. at 48 (letter for the record from Gregory T. Nojeim) (advocating that the
committee “address longstanding concerns with the ambiguity and breadth of the CFAA”); Cyber
Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 39 (2011) (statement of Orin S. Kerr,
Professor of Law, George Washington University) (“I think the answer is to narrow the scope of
[CFAA] . . . .”). The sole exception to this was some initial concern in the 1980s about enforcement
against whistleblowers.
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in its most common uses today—with significant implications for individual
liability and the scope of federal jurisdiction—surely Congress would have
spoken more plainly, and would have deliberated the consequences.207
CONCLUSION: A LIMITED ROLE FOR CYBERCRIME LIABILITY
Cybercrime is a serious and growing problem, resulting in (by some estimates)
over $100 billion in losses per year.208 The primary response by federal and state
legislatures, so far, has been to impose and expand cybercrime liability.209
That approach is no longer tenable. The drawbacks of excessive scope are
real—constituting a majority of civil cases and about half of criminal cases.
Those drawbacks are inherent in the very concept of computer abuse liability.
Constructing digital analogies to physical trespass and property damage
had an understandable logic in the 1970s and 1980s; computer systems were
relatively rare, single-purpose, limited to particular users, dedicated to
sensitive applications, and had scarce resources.210 Legislators and courts
could afford to play somewhat fast and loose with “authorization,” “damage,”
and other key scoping provisions, since egregious misconduct was more
readily ascertainable: breaking into the nuclear weapons laboratory at Los
Alamos, for example, or tampering with medical records at the Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center. Both of these examples are drawn directly from
early hearings on federal cybercrime law.211
207 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 (“If Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to
everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well include
everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose.”).
208 See, e.g., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME (2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economicimpact-cybercrime2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBP8-ANZT] (extrapolating from global data on the cost of
cybercrime to produce admittedly rough estimates of losses totaling between $375 and $575 billion).
209 See Stewart Baker, Poisoning the Hamburger Helper, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 11, 2011),
http://volokh.com/2011/09/11/poisoning-the-hamburger-helper/ [https://perma.cc/PE6J-8V6V] (“Every
time Congress gets exercised about cybersecurity, the Justice Department claims that the CFAA needs to be
updated.”); Orin S. Kerr, Powerpoint: Domestic Cybersecurity Law (or at Least Parts of It) (2014),
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/kerr_stanfordslides.pdf [https://perma.cc/853B-9XT7] (“Expanding
CFAA becomes Congress’s favorite way to ‘do something’ about cybersecurity.”).
210 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2003) (“Unauthorized access statutes are creatures of the 1970s,
when the Internet remained the domain of a few scientists and engineers . . . . While technology has
advanced considerably in the last three decades, the law has not; the same one-size-fits-all prohibitions
on unauthorized access still govern.”); Greg Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 1, 10 (using one computer crime statute
for myriad activities “has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes”).
211 See Computer Viruses: Hearing on the Impact of Computer Viruses and Other Forms of Computer
Sabotage or Exploitation on Computer Information Systems and Networks Before the S. Subcomm. On Tech.
and the Law, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 6 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey)
(discussing a hack into the computers at Los Alamos); The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986:
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Today, of course, computer systems are pervasive, have myriad functions,
can be shared by millions of users, and are used for everyday activities.
Assessing the scope of authorization and calibrating compensable harm are
radically different and far more challenging tasks; defendants tend to have
some permission with respect to a computer system, and conduct at issue tends
to be less patently wrongful. Plaintiffs and prosecutors can craft a colorable
cybercrime claim from myriad modern fact patterns, dragging the courts into
doctrinal quagmires and chilling socially beneficial activities.
As against this downside, there is not much upside. The plausible
deterrence benefits of cybercrime law are, empirically, negligible.
Cybercrime law does have value, to be sure. Prosecutors are able to charge
serious offenders on occasion, and meaningful criminal sanctions should be
available. But, on the whole, cybercrime law is an exceedingly limited
mechanism for addressing online misconduct.
The federal and state governments have a number of other viable
responses to cybercrime. They could mitigate the harms associated with
security breaches, by enacting notification and credit monitoring mandates.212
They could improve defenses, by leveraging acquisitions, promoting best
practices, and facilitating information sharing.213 In areas of critical
infrastructure, or where sensitive data are involved, they could impose ex ante
security standards and ex post regulatory liability.214

Hearing on S. 2281 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 39 (1986) (statement of Joseph
Tomkins, Chairman, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer
Crime) (describing the “infiltration of hospital records” at the Sloan Kettering Cancer Institute).
212 At the time of writing, forty-seven states have enacted data breach notification laws. See Security
Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7
VAZ-RDQU] (collecting state data breach notification statutes). The Obama Administration has also twice
proposed a federal data breach notification requirement. THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION
DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5RSQ-F4Y7]; THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD
(2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS9S-VRX8]. At
the federal level, there are also sector-specific data breach notification rules. See GINA STEVENS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
LAWS (2010).
213 See generally Jonathan Mayer & Edward W. Felten, California Must Lead on Cybersecurity,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/the-conversation/article7967445.html
[https://perma.cc/WF89-DF5M] (suggesting state-level policies that would promote cybersecurity).
214 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243-59 (3d Cir. 2015) (sustaining FTC
Act liability for a breached business); COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2015) (security requirements for certain
children’s information); GLBA Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1-5 (2015) (security requirements for certain
financial information); HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (2015) (security requirements for
certain medical information); FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CHAIRMAN WHEELER’S PROPOSAL TO GIVE
BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE, TRANSPARENCY, AND SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO
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For too long, federal and state policies have overemphasized malicious
computer abusers as the exclusive cause of serious cybersecurity incidents.
The temptation is understandable—as Ronald Coase famously observed, law
conventionally allocates responsibility to actions that give rise to social costs,
rather than inaction that magnifies those costs.215 But technology owners and
operators are often in the best position to repel and remediate online
misconduct. They just lack sufficient incentives to do so in the status quo—
incentives that cybercrime litigation will never provide.

THEIR DATA (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0310/DOC-338159A1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7LTA-VK2C] (proposed security requirements for broadband Internet service providers).
215 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13-15 (1960).

